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I. INTRODUCTION
For the November 2, 2004 general election, Mr. and Mrs. Henning
drove over 700 miles to cast their votes. Unfortunately, their votes were
not counted.'
The Hennings' experience with Washington State's election ma-
chinery began when they moved from Klickitat County to Clallam
County. Having moved, the Hennings changed their voter registration at
a local office of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) during the
summer of 2004.2 Not having received previously requested absentee
ballots, the Hennings inquired about their registration status in Clallam
County.3 The Hennings were informed that they were not registered vot-
ers in Clallam County because the facility at the DMV was not author-
ized to re-register voters.4 The only alternative was to drive to Klickitat
County and cast their ballots at their old polling place.5 At the polling
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1. Declaration of Donald Henning in Support of Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 6, McDon-
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place in Klickitat County, the Hennings were informed that they were not
registered voters in that county either.6 In order to preserve their votes,
the Hennings requested and received a provisional ballot. 7 After casting
their ballots and following the instructions of local polling officials, the
Hennings placed their provisional ballots into sealed envelopes and
handed the envelopes to election officials. 8 On November 19th, the Hen-
nings received a letter from the Klickitat County Auditor's Office, 9 stat-
ing that their provisional ballots would not be counted.' 0 Apparently, the
County Auditor's Office had received a notice from the Hennings indi-
cating that they were moving to another county," though the Hennings
could not recall giving the Auditor any such notice. 12
So, after driving over 700 miles to cast their votes, the Hennings'
effort to exercise that fundamental right was for naught. The Hennings'
experience set a new benchmark for assessing the impact of bureaucratic
procedures on stifling and, in some instances, preventing the counting of
a ballot cast in accordance with those procedures. Clearly the Hennings
believed that their right to vote was fundamental. The Hennings' beliefs
were in accord with existing law.
The right to vote is fundamental' 3 and is at the core of our represen-
tative democracy. 14 In our system of government, citizens have the final
say in the selection of governmental officials who, through their political
6. Id.
7. Id. As a result of the 2000 presidential elections, Congress enacted the Help America Vote
Act of 2002 (HAVA), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 10,
36, and 42 U.S.C.). Under HAVA, an eligible voter who does not appear on the list of registered
voters at the time of an election for federal officials must be offered a provisional ballot after the
voter declares his or her eligibility to vote. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a) (2002).
8. Declaration of Donald Henning at 6, McDonald, 153 Wash. 2d 201, 103 P.3d 722.
9. "'County auditor' means the county auditor in a noncharter county or the officer, irrespec-
tive of title, having the overall responsibility to maintain voter registration and to conduct state and
local elections in a charter county." WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.04.025 (2003). "The county auditor of
each county shall be ex officio the supervisor of all primaries and elections, general or special, and it
shall be the county auditor's duty to provide places for holding such primaries and elections." Id. §
29A.04.216 (2004).
10. Declaration of Donald Henning at 7, McDonald, 153 Wash. 2d 201, 103 P.3d 722; see
also Nicole Brodeur, Silenced Voices Are Heard, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at BI.
1I. Declaration of Donald Henning at 7, McDonald, 153 Wash. 2d 201, 103 P.3d 722.
12. Id. 7.
13. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society."); see also Foster v. Sunnyside Valley Irriga-
tion Dist., 102 Wash. 2d 395, 404, 687 P.2d 841, 846 (1984) ("The right to vote is fundamental
under both the United States and Washington Constitutions.").
14. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555 ("The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is of
the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representa-
tive government."); see also U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA
DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, at iv (2001) ("Voting is the language of our democ-
racy.").
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leadership, guide our country, state, and local communities. 15 In their
assigned roles, these elected officials weigh competing social, economic,
and political interests and make a calibrated assessment of how these
interests are incorporated into public policy and legislative action. If the
balance struck by these elected officials is not reflective of the interests
valued by the community at large, the electoral process provides the ul-
timate form of accountability-the officials are not re-elected. Thus, the
vibrancy of our body politic and the continued legitimacy of our form of
government rest upon the understanding that the electoral process will
accurately reflect the will of the people. When the integrity of that proc-
ess is compromised, the legitimacy of our governments and the public
confidence in our public institutions is seriously undermined.
16
The recent 2004 Washington state gubernatorial election, pitting
Democratic Party nominee Christine Gregoire against Republican Party
nominee Dino Rossi, exposed deficiencies in the administration of elec-
tions in the State of Washington and thereby created a major political
crisis. The various machine and hand recounts produced different elec-
toral outcomes. 7 Because the vote margin between the two major candi-
15. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) ("No right is more precious in a free country
than that of having a voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens,
we must live."); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: UNFULFILLED GOALS I
(1981) ("The right to vote is central to full political participation of all citizens of this Nation. It
grants to all citizens the power to elect those persons who make decisions affecting their lives."). For
a history of the right to vote in the United States see generally ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
16. In the aftermath of the 2004 gubernatorial election, many irate voters expressed their disen-
chantment with the electoral process. See, e.g., Andrew Garber, State Task Force Gets Earful over
Gubernatorial Election, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at B4 ("'This election has been a farce,'
Dawn Courtney, of Castle Rock, told the panel; 'Because of this botched election, voters have lost
confidence in the election system."'); Dave Bums, Letter to the Editor, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 14,
2005, at B7 ("Well, now that Christine Gregoire (with the help of King County elections office) has
stolen the election and has been sworn in, maybe we can all get on with our lives. Even if that means
having little to no faith in the democratic process."); Garry Gracey, Letter to the Editor, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at B7 ("By accepting office [Governor] Gregoire has made a mockery of
Washington's state's election process and, unless this injustice is corrected, the voters in this state
may never trust the election process again."); MariLyn Sabo, Letter to the Editor, SEATTLE TIMES,
Jan. 11, 2005, at B7 ("The irregularities of changing the rules after the election has taken place and
the mysterious discovery of ballots after the first (and second) recounts put a taint on the process.
Now that some of the ballots have been altered by elections officials, another recount would be
meaningless."); Bernice Whitney, Letter to the Editor, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at B7 ("Is
democracy failing? Are we going the way of other less-than-free societies?"); Kate Cummins, Letter
to the Editor, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at B7 ("The only thing that is crystal-clear in all of this
is that the real loser is the voter. As long as the party has its chosen winner, who cares about the
voter?"); Chuck Hastings, Letter to the Editor, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 21, 2004, at B7 ("The voters of
this state basically did not make their choice. The courts will now be picking the next governor. Half
of Washington's voters are going to feel cheated, no matter what happens next.").
17. The original vote count showed Rossi ahead of the Gregoire by 261 votes. Wash. Sec'y of
State, http://vote.wa.gov/general/ (click on "Statewide" tab; then follow "Governor" hyperlink) (last
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dates was miniscule, 18 changes in the electoral outcomes and subsequent
litigation were inevitable. After two state supreme court rulings 9 and an
election contest filed under state law, Christine Gregoire became the
state's twenty-second governor.20
This Article details the plethora of problems associated with Wash-
ington State's 2004 gubernatorial election and explores the proposed
electoral reforms in light of prior threats to the electoral process. The
Article postulates that electoral reforms in the administration of elections
also present an important opportunity to provide minority communities
with greater access to the political process. In an effort to address the
concerns arising from the election, Seattle University School of Law and
the Seattle University Law Review sponsored a symposium entitled:
"Where's My Vote? Lessons Learned from Washington State's Guberna-
torial Election." The symposium was held on April 16, 2005, and in-
cluded presentations on the election and the corresponding litigation, the
importance of the right to vote, the efforts of national civil rights organi-
zations to protect minority voting rights, and a discussion of possible
legislative solutions for improving the administration of elections.
The results of this symposium are now incorporated within this is-
sue of the Law Review. Part II of this Article begins with a history of
visited Nov. 14, 2005). Because the vote margin was within the margin triggering an automatic
recount, a machine recount was conducted. See WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.64.021(l)(a) (2005) (re-
count is triggered if vote margin is less than 2000 votes between the two front-runners and less than
0.5% of votes cast for both front-runners). After the machine recount, Rossi was ahead by 42 votes.
Wash. Sec'y of State, http://vote.wa.gov/general/recount.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2005). Thereaf-
ter, the Democratic Party requested a manual recount of all ballots cast pursuant to WASH. REV.
CODE § 29A.64.011 (2004). After the manual recount, Gregoire was ahead by 129 votes. Wash.
Sec'y of State, http://vote.wa.gov/generallrecount.aspx (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
18. The Washington 2004 gubernatorial election is not the only election in the state's history
where the margin of victory was narrow and a mandatory recount was undertaken. For example, in
the 2000 United States Senate contest, the original margin of victory was only 1953 votes and the
final margin of victory was 2229 votes. Wash. Sec'y of State-History of Recounts,
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/office/osos_news.aspx?i=TjrRx9TQ4KvO37C9GJJtuw%3d%3d (last
visited Nov. 14, 2005). In the 2000 Secretary of State contest, the final margin of victory was 10,222
votes. Id. In other elections similar final margins were reported (1991--nitiative 120 (involving
abortion rights)-4222 votes; 1990-SJR 8212 (involving taxation of low-income housing)-1540
votes; 1977-Initiative 348 (involving repeal of gas tax)-884 votes; 1968-State Attorney General
contest-5368 votes). Id.
19. Wash. State Republican Party v. King County, 153 Wash. 2d 220, 103 P.3d 725 (2004)
(rejecting challenge by Republican Party to the authority of the vote canvassing authority in a man-
ual recount to recanvass ballots in order to correct previous errors); McDonald v. Reed, 153 Wash.
2d 201, 103 P.3d 722 (2004) (rejecting petition filed by Democratic Party to require Secretary of
State to promulgate uniform standards for recounting of votes).
20. For a complete listing of Washington's governors see HistoryLink Essay: Governors of
Wash. Territory and Wash. State, http://www.historylink.org/essays/output.cfm?file-id=5454 (last
visited Nov. 14, 2005).
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voting discrimination in the United States. This history provides a con-
text to the 2004 gubernatorial election in Washington. In addition, this
history provides an important background context for assessing whether
reforms in the administration of elections will have a corresponding im-
pact on the political integration of minority communities. Part II closes
with a brief discussion of the possible convergence of efforts to reform
the electoral process and to incorporate minority communities into the
body politic. Part III discusses the events that unfolded in the 2004 gu-
bernatorial election and describes the crisis that ensued. Finally, Part IV
provides a brief overview of legislation enacted in the Washington State
2005 Regular Legislative Session in order to assess whether all of the
major problems identified in the 2004 gubernatorial election have been
addressed. In publishing this Symposium Issue, the School of Law and
the Law Review seek to contribute to the ongoing discourse regarding
efforts to restore public confidence in the integrity of the electoral proc-
ess. Through this discourse, and through actions by legislative and
county election officials to improve the administration of elections, pub-
lic confidence in this important process can be restored.
II. CONTEXT
The political crisis created by the 2004 gubernatorial election has
historical roots extending to the founding of our country. This Part will
highlight the voting discrimination that was enshrined within our Consti-
tution, the failure of post-Civil War efforts to expand the right to vote to
African Americans, the continued efforts to suppress minority voting
strength in the latter part of the nineteenth century, the renewed move-
ment after World War II to enfranchise African Americans, and the fed-
eral response that culminated in the adoption of the federal Voting Rights
Act.21
Unfortunately, in our nation's history voting was not viewed as a
right, but as a privilege-a privilege that was expanded only after the
Civil War. Initially, the right to vote was primarily limited to white males
with property.22 Upon adoption and ratification, the United States Consti-
tution deferred to the election laws and practices of the states by not
21. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
22. KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 5 ("The lynchpin of both colonial and British suffrage regula-
tions was the restriction of voting to adult men who owned property."); id. at 6 ("Freedmen of Afri-
can or Amerindian descent were denied the ballot in much of the South.").
2006]
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enunciating a specific right to vote. However, the right to vote was indi-
rectly affected by the Constitution's Three-Fifths Clause.23
With respect to African Americans, the right to vote did not materi-
ally advance until the end of the Civil War and the adoption and ratifica-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment, which declared slavery illegal.2 4 Dur-
ing the early phases of the Reconstruction Era, statutes authorizing a re-
admission of states of the former Confederacy into the Union included
provisions for expanding suffrage to the newly freed slaves. 25 However,
due to the necessity of providing a constitutional basis for preventing the
states from discriminating on the basis of race in granting the right to
vote, the Fifteenth Amendment was ratified in 1870.26 Shortly thereafter,
Congress enacted two statutes that provided, for a brief period of time
from 1870 to 1873, an aggressive federal enforcement of the right to
27vote. A mixture of national presidential politics in the 1872 presidential
election, increased violence of the Ku Klux Klan, and a lack of national
resolve to continue to provide federal protection to the newly freed
slaves contributed to the lack of federal enforcement. 28 This lack of fed-
eral enforcement was reflected in two United States Supreme Court deci-
23. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 & amend. XV. The
Three-fifths Clause provided that persons who were not free would only be counted as three-fifths of
a person in determining the population base for apportioning congressional seats among the various
states. Most of the persons who were not free at the time the Constitution became effective on March
4, 1789, were African American slaves. The Clause has been identified as the first major compro-
mise between the slaveholding southern agricultural interests and the northern commercial interests
which assured that the southern states would ratify the Constitution. As a result of this Clause,
southern states were over-represented in Congress and exercised considerable influence in the ap-
pointment of chairs to important congressional committees. In fact, the election of Thomas Jefferson
to the Presidency in 1800 is attributable to the increased congressional representation of southern
states in the Electoral College. See Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The
Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 428, 433-50 (1999); GARRY
WILLS, NEGRO PRESIDENT: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 51-61 (2003).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
25. Gabriel J. Chin, The "Voting Rights Act of 1867": The Constitutionality of Federal Regula-
tion of Suffrage During Reconstruction, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1581, 1590 (2004) (The Military Recon-
struction Act, Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 163 14 Stat. 428, provided a framework for the readmission
of states into the Union: "All Southern states complied with the Act's requirements, adopting new
constitutions with broad suffrage." (footnote omitted)).
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; see also Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously:
Rediscovering the Fifteenth Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REV. 389 (1985) (arguing a conceptual failure
of the United States Supreme Court and commentators to fulfill the promise of fair representation
due to the refusal to fully embrace rights protected under the Fifteenth Amendment).
27. Act of February 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433 (amending the Act of May 31, 1870); Act of May
31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140 (enforcing the right of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states
of the union, and for other purposes); see ROBERT J. KACZOROWSKI, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
INTERPRETATION: THE FEDERAL COURTS, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND CIVIL RIGHTS, 1866-
1876, at 62-92 (2005).
28. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877 (1988).
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sions that severely restricted the reach of the 1870 and 1871 federal
acts. 29 Finally, the official end of Reconstruction occurred with the Com-
promise of 1877, which resulted in a decreased military presence in the
South and the selection of Rutherford B. Hayes as the nineteenth Presi-
dent.3"
A. Limiting Minorities Right to Vote
The end of Reconstruction heralded a new era of minority disen-
franchisement. This era continued, with some notable exceptions, well
into the end of the nineteenth century and the middle of the twentieth
century until the commencement of what has been termed the Second
Reconstruction. 31 During the latter part of the nineteenth century, south-
ern states adopted a variety of procedures that had the effect of prevent-
ing African Americans from registering to vote and from voting.32 These
devices included literacy tests requiring a potential voter registrant to
read, write, or interpret a provision of a state constitution to the satisfac-
tion of a voter registration official or clerk.33 These devices were not just
limited to the southern states. In fact, the State of Washington had such a
requirement in its constitution: "The legislature shall enact laws defining
the manner of ascertaining the qualifications of voters as to their ability
to read and speak the English language, and providing for punishment of
persons voting or registering in violation of the provisions of this sec-
29. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (holding that Constitution does not grant
or secure the right to vote in the states); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (holding that
Congress has not as of yet provided by 'appropriate legislation' for the punishment of the offense
charged in the indictment). See generally ROBERT M. GOLDMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND BLACK
SUFFRAGE: LOSING THE VOTE IN REESE AND CRUIKSHANK (2001).
30. C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END
OF RECONSTRUCTION 2, 5-7 (1951); see also ROY MORRIS, JR., FRAUD OF THE CENTURY,
RUTHERFORD B. HAYES, SAMUEL TILDEN, AND THE STOLEN ELECTION OF 1876, at 246 (2003).
31. The term "Second Reconstruction" refers to that period of time after World War II where
civil rights activities within minority communities resulted in changes in governmental policies and
laws that were enacted to improve the political, economic, and educational status of minority com-
munities. See infra note 39.
32. KEYSSAR, supra note 15, at 111-16.
33. Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 537
(1973). In order to prevent the disenfranchisement of illiterate whites, "most states established a
number of alternatives to the literacy test: an 'understanding' test, property qualification, a good
character requirement, or most transparent of all, a 'grandfather clause' [permitting an exemption
from the literacy test if the potential registrant either served and fought honorably in the armed ser-
vices of the United States or the Confederacy]." Id. As noted by the author, these provisions "were
designed to give the registrar an elastic standard to implement the avowed intention of disenfranchis-
ing blacks but not whites .... Id. at 538.
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tion. ' '34 Other devices included limiting voter participation in political
party primaries to whites 35 and imposing a poll tax.36 The impact of these
devices in suppressing minority participation in voting cannot be over-
emphasized.
However, perhaps the most significant obstacle to minority voter
registration and voting was the violence perpetrated by white suprema-
cist terrorist groups and racist individuals:
The reign of terror inaugurated by the Ku Klux Klan and other ter-
rorist groups has been well documented .... Terrorism became a
concern of the federal government because local law enforcement
agencies and officers were utterly unable or unwilling to deal with
it. Whole sections of Southern states experienced breakdowns in
law and order. Their populations were subjected to the mercy of or-
ganized bands of criminals who attacked them with impunity. While
whipping was the most common form of violence, shooting, beat-
ing, murder, rape, and various forms of torture were not infrequent.
Further, these criminals destroyed property and stole weapons. Eco-
nomic intimidation and social ostracism were also included in the
arsenal of the Ku Klux Klan.37
The cumulative impact of this systematic campaign of terror, the
absence of federal enforcement, and the hostility of local officials to Af-
rican American political participation had a very predictable outcome. In
some parts of the country, most notably in the southern states, there were
very severely depressed levels of African American voter registration
34. WASH. CONST. amend. 11 (1896) (amending WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 1), amended by
WASH. CONST. amends. X & LXIII; see also FRANK PIERCE, PIERCE'S CODE: A COMPILATION OF
ALL THE LAWS IN FORCE IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 39 (1905).
35. These were known as white primaries. Derfner, supra note 33, at 538.
36. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: A STUDY OF THE
PARTICIPATION BY NEGROES IN THE ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL PROCESS N SOUTHERN STATES
SINCE PASSAGE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, at 6 (1968) [hereinafter POLITICAL
PARTICIPATION].
37. KACZOROWSKI, supra note 27, at 43 (footnote omitted); id. at 43 ("The brutality and sav-
agery of these crimes made them distinctive. United States circuit judge High L. Bond was appalled
when he learned that a North Carolina woman was dragged from her cabin, beaten, and then 'her
hair burned off her privates."'); id at 43-44 ("With membership rolls numbering into the hundreds
in some counties, the Klan effectively paralyzed local government agencies and officers."); id. at 44
("Local officials and agencies were overwhelmed by the magnitude of such criminality."). Lynching
also continued to be a tool for terrorizing the African American community. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 51 (2004) ("In the 1890s, the number of southern blacks lynched each year was usually
one hundred or more .... ) (footnote omitted); see also TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 21 (1947) (table showing the number of lynchings
for both whites and African Americans from 1882 to 1946). See generally DANIEL LEVITAS, THE
TERRORIST NEXT DOOR (2002) (for a review of modern domestic terrorist groups, both racial and
political).
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and voter participation rates. 38 Efforts to reverse this trend began after
the end of World War II and the commencement of the Second Recon-
struction.
B. Protecting Voting Rights During the Second Reconstruction
President Harry Truman's presidency was integral in commencing
the Second Reconstruction. Although there is no fixed date as to the offi-
cial commencement of the Second Reconstruction, 39 a defensible argu-
ment attributes the beginning of this era to the Truman presidency.
38. From 1876 to the 1950s there were some notable exceptions to this sordid history of minor-
ity political oppression. For example, the United States Supreme Court in Guinn v. United States,
238 U.S. 347 (1915), outlawed the use of grandfather clauses. In addition, the Court, in a series of
cases, effectively limited the use of the white primary as a tool for disenfranchising African Ameri-
cans. See Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (all white private association which conducted a pre-
primary selection ruled unconstitutional); Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (approving
Democratic Party convention resolution limiting party membership to whites), overruled by Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (Court removed discretion of
party executive committee to establish membership qualifications which limited membership to
whites only); Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (African Americans permitted to vote in De-
mocratic Party primary). However, during this same time period, the Court reached a nadir with
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (established separate but equal doctrine) and with Giles v.
Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903), where Justice Holmes, in a case involving the repeated unsuccessful
efforts of an African American to register to vote, made a remarkable admission regarding the reality
of a racist political environment and the powerlessness of the federal judiciary to provide any redress
to limit this abuse of political power:
The bill imports that the great mass of the white population intends to keep the blacks
from voting. To meet such an intent something more than ordering the plaintiff's name to
be inscribed upon the lists of 1902 will be needed. If the conspiracy and the intent exist, a
name on a piece of paper will not defeat them. Unless we are prepared to supervise the
voting in that state by officers of the court, it seems to us that all that the plaintiff could
get from equity would be an empty form. Apart from damages to the individual, relief
from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the state it-
self, must be given by them or by the legislative and political department of the govern-
ment of the United States.
Giles, 189 U.S. at 488.
39. Although there is no exact date for the official beginning of the Second Reconstruction, the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that
racial segregation in public school systems is unconstitutional) has been viewed as the beginning of
the Second Reconstruction. See J. MORGAN KOUSSER, COLORBLIND INJUSTICE: MINORITY VOTING
RIGHTS AND THE UNDOING OF THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 14 (1999) (noting that Professor C.
Vann Woodward coined the term Second Reconstruction as referring to time period after the Brown
decision). Such a birth date would seem appropriate because of Brown's indisputable place as the
harbinger of the modem civil rights movement. See CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE
SPEED, REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 13-14
(2004) (Brown viewed "as perhaps the most significant case on race in America's history" which led
to more than a dozen unanimous decisions eliminating barriers to racial equality). Another possible
date is April 25, 1938, when the Court decided United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144
(1938), and intimated that a "searching judicial inquiry" may be appropriate in reviewing state action
that serves to "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities." Id. at 153 n.4; KOUSSER, supra, at
68 ("If [Justice] Bradley's pronouncement in The Civil Rights Cases [109 U.S. 3 (1883)] helped to
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In a dramatic move several months before the presidential election
of 1948, President Truman issued a series of historic Executive Orders
that resulted in a substantial improvement on employment and contract-
ing opportunities for African Americans. 40 President Truman's Decem-
ber 5, 1946 Executive Order 9808 was particularly noteworthy. This or-
der created the first ever presidential Committee on Civil Rights.41 On
October 29, 1947, the Committee issued a historic report recommending
42a variety of actions to address issues related to racial discrimination.
Pursuant to these recommendations, President Truman announced that
civil rights reforms were a top priority in his January 7, 1948 State of the
Union address.43
President Truman also sought the passage of comprehensive civil
rights legislation to implement the recommendations of the Committee
Civil Rights.44 Moreover, he made four critical appointments to the
Supreme Court.45 These Justices were in the majority on major civil
usher out the First Reconstruction, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone's famous footnote 4 in U.S. v.
Carolene Products Co. was both a precursor and precondition of the Second [Reconstruction].").
40. On July 26, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9980, 13 Fed. Reg. 4311
(July 26, 1948) and Executive Order No. 9981, 13 Fed. Reg. 4313 (July 26, 1948). "Executive Order
No. 9980 not only mandated the immediate elimination of race-based discrimination in the federal
bureaucracy, but also established the specific procedures for blacks to follow to gain fair and open
access to jobs long denied them...." MICHAEL R. GARDNER, HARRY TRUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS:
MORAL COURAGE AND POLITICAL RISKS 111 (2002). Executive Order 9981 integrated the armed
services and "represented the most significant institutional advance for the civil rights of black
Americans since President Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation." Id. at 112. Additional
executive orders provided minorities with greater employment protections and greater access to
government contracts. Id. at 158, 160; Exec. Order No. 10,210, 16 Fed. Reg. 1049 (Feb. 2, 1951);
Exec. Order No. 10,308, 16 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Dec. 3, 1951).
41. Exec. Order No. 9808, 11 Fed. Reg. 14,153 (Dec. 7, 1946); see also GARDNER, supra note
40, at 14-19.
42. The Committee issued 35 recommendations ranging from employment opportunities in the
federal government to the elimination of obstacles that hindered minority political participation. Id.
at 58-61.
43. GARDNER, supra note 40, at 65-70 (emphasizing urgency in the enforcement of civil
rights).
44. On April 28, 1949, in response to President Truman's request, Senator J. Howard McGrath
introduced Senate Bill 1725, 81st Cong. (1949) ("To provide a means of further securing and pro-
tecting the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States"), Senate Bill 1726, 81st
Cong. (1949) ("To provide protection of persons from lynching, and for other purposes"), Senate
Bill 1727, 81st Cong. (1949) ("Making unlawful the requirement for the payment of a poll tax as a
prerequisite to voting in a primary or other election for national officers"), and Senate Bill 1728, 81st
Cong. (1949) ("To prohibit discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, or na-
tional origin" and proposing the establishment of a Fair Employment Practices Commission). Con-
gress did not adopt this proposed legislation.
45. The four Justices he appointed were Chief Justice Fred Moore Vinson, Justice Harold Hitz
Burton, Justice Tom Campbell Clark, and Justice Sherman Minton. GARDNER, supra note 40, at
167-173.
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rights decisions involving racially restrictive real estate covenants,46 seg-
regated railroad passenger cars, 47 and segregated educational institu-
tions.48 And, most significantly, Justices Clark, Minton, and Burton were
part of the Supreme Court's unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of
Education.49
In summary, President Truman's aggressive support of civil rights
for racial minorities provided an important endorsement for the increased
efforts of minority communities to desegregate public facilities and se-
cure equal rights in the areas of housing, voting, and employment. Such
an endorsement provided strong support for the increased civil rights
activities within the African American community, which ultimately
culminated in the demonstrations of the 1950s and 1960s. Until Tru-
man's presidency, no president since Lincoln had demonstrated leader-
ship that even approached the leadership exemplified by President Tru-
man in enforcing civil rights for minorities.5°
46. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (Vinson and Burton in the majority); Hurd v.
Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (Vinson and Burton, JJ., in the majority).
47. Henderson v. United States, 339 U.S. 816 (1950) (Vinson, Burton, and Minton, JJ., in the
majority).
48. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (Vinson, Burton, Clark, and Minton, JJ., in the
majority); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (Vinson, Burton,
Clark, and Minton, JJ., in the majority).
49. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 2 (2005),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf.
50. See, e.g., FONER, supra note 28, at 178-180, 276 (Andrew Johnson (1865-1869)---held
racist views and generally opposed congressional efforts to improve the condition of the newly freed
slaves); id. at 528, 577 (Ulysses S. Grant (1869-1877)--"1n retrospect, however, it is clear that,
partly due to events outside his own control, Grant in his second term presided over a broad retreat
from the policies of Reconstruction..." and privately viewed the passage of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment prohibiting racial discrimination in the area of voting as a mistake as being "no good" to Afri-
can Americans and "a hindrance to the South .... "); RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE
NEGRO 23, 45 (New, Enlarged ed., Collier Books, 1969) (1965) (Rutherford B. Hayes (1877-
1881 )-described as "the principal presidential architect of the consolidation of white supremacy in
the South, during the post-Reconstruction period" resulting in a greater entrenchment of white su-
premacy-"[w]hite supremacy was more securely entrenched in the South when he left the White
House than it had been when he had entered it."); id. at 54 (James A. Garfield (1881-assassination in
1881)-during his short Presidency, Garfield did appoint several African Americans to prominent
positions); id. at 55 (Chester A. Arthur (1881-1885)---also appointed several African Americans to
senior government positions, but was also criticized for his political alignment with Southern De-
mocrats); id. at 60, 89-92 (Grover Cleveland (1885-1889 & 1893-1897)-continued with practice
of appointing African Americans to certain jobs, noted progress of African Americans in messages
and statements, but did not undertake actions to improve the condition of African Americans); id. at
64-67, 85-87 (Benjamin Harrison (1889-1893)-Harrison did provide support for the protection of
the African American voting rights in his annual messages to Congress, which ultimately led to
unsuccessful congressional efforts to enact a voting rights act); id. at 97 (William McKinley (1897-
1901 & 1901 -assassination in 1901)--continued the practice of appointing a few African Americans
to certain federal positions, but "[o]n the vitally more important question of Negro suffrage,
McKinley remained silent, until the party in 1900 made its usual appeal for Negro votes.");
KLARMAN, supra note 37, at 24, 41 (Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909)-initially followed practice
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President Truman's leadership in the area of civil rights-
demonstrated through the promulgation of Executive Orders, appoint-
ments to the United States Supreme Court, and themes in his State of the
Union address-provided important support to a burgeoning national
civil rights movement. This movement received an important boost with
the Warren Court's landmark school desegregation case in Brown v.
Board of Education, which heralded a new era of civil rights activism in
a variety of areas. 51 This activism culminated in the enactment of the
1957, 1960, and 1964 Civil Rights Acts. 52 These acts depended upon en-
forcement by the federal government. Since the scope and extent of Afri-
can American disenfranchisement throughout the south reached substan-
tial proportions, these acts were not effective in increasing African
American voter registration.5 3 During the 1950s and 1960s, apart from
the continued violence perpetrated against civil rights activists, 54 the
of appointing African Americans to selected federal posts; however, after public criticism discontin-
ued the practice while proclaiming "in 1905 that 'racial purity must be maintained'); id. at 67 (Wil-
liam Howard Taft (1909-1913)--"Republican racial policy continued to deteriorate ... ," eliminated
federal patronage for African Americans, and "supported lily-white factions within southern Repub-
lican parties .... "); id. at 68 (Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921)-although initially promising to im-
prove the conditions of African Americans, under Wilson's administration, the federal workforce
became segregated, including the armed forces); id at 123, 147 (Warren G. Harding (1921-1923)--
Harding did support a federal anti-lynching statute and "[iun 1921, President Harding criticized race
discrimination in the political and economic spheres but firmly rejected 'every suggestion of social
equality' and insisted that 'racial amalgamation there cannot be."'); id. at 107 (Calvin Coolidge
(1923-1929)-Coolidge was not cordial to African American leaders and in the 1924 presidential
election, was the only candidate who "declined to repudiate the Ku Klux Klan."); id at 108 (Herbert
Hoover (1929-1933)-Hoover continued to bolster "the lily-white factions of southern Republican
parties in an effort to exclude blacks" and was a silent voice for civil rights reforms: "During his
presidency, Hoover never spoke out against disfranchisement, peonage, or lynching."); id. at 115,
168 (Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945)--Roosevelt could not endorse a civil rights bill, a federal
anti-lynching bill, or a bill to outlaw the poll tax because of anticipated Southern opposition); see
also RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE Two RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK
ENFRANCHISEMENT 153, 154-56 (2004) (Although receiving substantial voter support from the
African American community, "Roosevelt never made an open effort to address disenfranchisement.
Indeed, he committed himself to postponing any attempt at such a program.").
51. See generally OGLETREE, supra note 39.
52. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 5, 28, and 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-449, 74 Stat. 86
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 20, and 42 U.S.C.); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.
L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered portions of 28 and 42 U.S.C.). For an
excellent summary of these acts as they relate to the right to vote see Derfner, supra note 33, at 544-
550.
53. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 36, at 10 ("These Acts... did not produce a signifi-
cant rise in Negro voter registration except in limited areas.").
54. The most notable incidents of racial violence were the bombing of the Sixteenth Street
Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, resulting in the deaths of four African American girls; the
Bloody Sunday march on Selma, Alabama; and the murder of three civil rights workers near Phila-
delphia, Mississippi. KLARMAN, supra note 37, at 437-40.
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most significant obstacle preventing African Americans from registering
to vote was the implementation of literacy tests.55
During the 1950s, voter registration by African Americans was in-
deed a long hard "slog." In 1956, Mrs. Melanie Dunham, an African
American, applied to register to vote in Walthall County, Mississippi.
56
She was not successful because the clerk deemed Mrs. Dunham's expla-
nation of the terms "ex post facto law" and "impeachment" as "inade-
quate. 57 In sharp contrast, in 1955, in the same county, Mr. Alton Ard, a
white applicant for voter registration, was asked to "copy and interpret
'There shall be no imprisonment for debt."' 58 Mr. Ard's application was
accepted.5 9
C. Voting Rights Act of 1965: Elimination ofLiteracy Tests
and Discriminatory Methods of Election,
and the Implementation ofBilingual Elections
As a result of heightened awareness of the discriminatory impact of
these literacy tests on minority voter registration, increased civil rights
activism, and public outrage over the ongoing violence in the south,
Congress enacted the landmark Voting Rights Act of 1965 (1965 Act).60
For those selected jurisdictions covered by the 1965 Act, which included
most of the southern states, there was a five-year suspension on the use
of literacy tests.6 1 The impact on African American voter registration was
dramatic. According to the United States Commission on Civil Rights,
there was a substantial increase in voter registration rates among African
Americans. 62 In Alabama, the percent of African Americans who were
registered voters in comparison to the voting age population prior to the
1965 Act was 19.3%, compared with the comparable figure for whites at
69.2%.63 After the 1965 Act, the African American voter registration rate
55. As noted by the United States Commission on Civil Rights:
The chief means of limiting the franchise in the 1950s and early 1960s was the literacy
test. State laws vested wide discretion in local registrars in administering these and other
qualification tests. Although the Department of Justice had a right to sue, litigation was
protracted and successfully reached only a small percentage of counties where Negro reg-
istration was being limited.
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 36, at 10.
56. Copy of Melanie Dunham's Voter Registration Application on file with author.
57. Id.
58. Copy of Alton Ard's Voter Registration Application on file with author.
59. Id.
60. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973-
1973bb-1 (2000)).
61. Id. at § 4(a) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971(a)(2)(C) (2003)).
62. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, supra note 36, at 12-13.
63. Id. at 12.
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for Alabama rose to an astonishing 51.6%.64 In Georgia, the pre-1965
Act voter registration rate for African Americans was 27.4%, compared
with the comparable figure for whites at 62.6%.65 After the 1965 Act, the
African American voter registration rate for Georgia nearly doubled to
52.6%.66 Perhaps the most dramatic figure of all is the pre-1965 Act
voter registration rate for African Americans in Mississippi which was a
remarkable 6.7%-the comparable figure for whites was 69.9%.67 After
the 1965 Act, the figure for African American voter registration rate rose
to 59.8%.68 The ban on literacy tests was extended nationally in the 1970
amendments69 to the 1965 Act and was made permanent with the 1975
amendments.7v
There were several other important sections of the 1965 Act and its
amendments that substantially increased access to the political process
for African Americans and other language minority groups.7' One of
these sections, Section 2 of the 1965 Act (Section 2),72 would play a
critical role in dismantling discriminatory methods of election during the
1980s.
Under Section 2, minorities can institute an action against a politi-
cal subdivision for implementing a voting qualification, or a prerequisite
to voting, or for implementing any standard, practice, or procedure that
has the effect of denying minority voters an equal opportunity to partici-
pate in the political process and elect candidates of their choice. 73 Pursu-
ant to Section 2, minority communities can challenge discriminatory at-
large methods of elections. 74 An at-large method of election refers to an
election where all of the voters can vote for candidates to a political sub-




67. Id. at 13.
68. Id.
69. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
70. Act of Aug. 6, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 400.
71. The term "language minority group" as defined in the Act "means persons who are Ameri-
can Indian, Asian American, Alaskan Natives or of Spanish heritage." 42 U.S.C. § 19731(c)(3)
(2005).
72. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2003)).
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Gomez v. City of Watsonville, 863 F.2d 1407 (9th Cir. 1988).
75. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 136 (8th ed. 2004) (definition of "at large"); see also CAL.
ELEC. CODE § 14026(a) (2003) (definition of "at-large method of election"); id. at § 14026(b) ("dis-
trict-based elections").
76. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 75.
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an at-large or multimember election district, candidates for office are not
required to live in particular areas of the jurisdiction.77 In jurisdictions
conducting at-large elections, minority communities-groups that are
also numerical minorities-are at a disadvantage if elections are charac-
terized by racially polarized voting. 78 Racially polarized voting occurs
when racial and ethnic groups vote differently. 9 Section 2 has been an
effective tool against the implementation of election districts that either
fragment or over-concentrate politically cohesive minority communities
in an effort to minimize their impact on the political process.80 As a re-
sult of amendments to Section 2 in 1982, minority voters need only dem-
onstrate that the challenged election structure or procedure has a dis-
criminatory effect on minority voting strength in order to prevail. 8 1
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., Gomez, 863 F.2d at 1411-13.
79. See Thomburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 53 n.21 (1986) ("'[R]acial polarization' exists
where there is 'a consistent relationship between [the] race of the voter and the way in which the
voter votes,"' (quoting Transcript of Record at 160, Gingles v. Edmisten, 590 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.C.
1984)); "or to put it differently, [racial polarization exists] where 'black voters and white voters vote
differently."' (quoting Transcript of Record at 203, Gingles, 590 F. Supp. 345)). If the white com-
munity does not support the candidates preferred by the minority community, and the white commu-
nity is a numerical majority, the minority preferred candidates will consistently be defeated. See id.
at 56.
80. See, e.g., Jose Garza, History, Latinos, and Redistricting, 6 TEX. HiSP. J.L. & POL'Y 125,
130 (2001) ("Litigation based on the 1982 amendments to Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and
the 'one person, one vote' rule had a critical impact for Mexican American voting rights and elec-
toral success in the 1980s and 1990s .... These legal actions were at least in part responsible for a
dramatic increase in Mexican American representation at various levels of governance." (footnote
omitted)).
81. Prior to the 1982 Amendments, voting rights practitioners were utilizing the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to challenge at-large
methods of election having a discriminatory effect on minority voting strength. See, e.g., White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). In 1973, the United States Supreme Court, for the first time, held an
at-large method of election unconstitutional. Id. The case involved a challenge to at-large or multi-
member legislative districts in Texas. Id. The Court held that an at-large method of election was
unconstitutional if it denied minorities an equal opportunity to participate in the political process and
elect candidates of their choice. Id. at 766. After White, cases challenging discriminatory at-large
methods of election were filed throughout the country. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
established a series of evidentiary factors to guide courts in evaluating the constitutionality of an at-
large method of election. Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (1973), ajfd sub noa. E. Carroll
Parish Sch. Bd. v. Marshall 424 U.S. 636 (1976). These factors included, among others, the history
of minority electoral success and the history of discrimination which precluded effective participa-
tion in the political process. Id. at 1305. These Zimmer factors became the evidentiary basis for at-
large election challenges. The dismantling of discriminatory at-large elections came to an abrupt halt
when the United States Supreme Court in 1980 imposed another onerous evidentiary requirement. In
City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), the Court held that proof of a discriminatory intent in
either establishing or maintaining an at-large method of election must be proved before such an
election method could be declared unconstitutional. Apart from the Court's constitutional interpreta-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court also held that there was nothing in the legislative re-
cord of the 1965 Voting Rights Act indicating that Section 2 adopted a burden of proof based solely
on establishing a discriminatory effect on minority voting strength. Id. at 61. Accordingly, after City
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During the drafting of the 1975 Amendments, Congress also exam-
ined the impact of English-only elections on language minority groups
who were eligible to vote but could not participate in elections because
of their inability to understand English. As stated in the 1965 Act:
The Congress finds that voting discrimination against citizens of
language minorities is pervasive and national in scope. Such mi-
nority citizens are from environments in which the dominant
language is other than English. In addition they have been denied
equal educational opportunities by State and local governments,
resulting in severe disabilities and continuing illiteracy in the
English language. The Congress further finds that, where State
and local officials conduct elections only in English, language
minority citizens are excluded from participating in the electoral
process. In many areas of the country, this exclusion is aggra-
vated by acts of physical, economic, and political intimidation.
The Congress declares that, in order to enforce the guarantees of
the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments to the United States
Constitution, it is necessary to eliminate such discrimination by
prohibiting English-only elections, and by prescribing other re-
medial devices.
Accordingly, political subdivisions subject to the Act's bilingual
election provisions have to provide both written and oral assistance at the
polls to persons who are not proficient in English. This assistance must
be provided in the language of the applicable language minority group.
83
In summary, the sections of the 1965 Act that prohibited the use of
literacy tests and other devices that physically prevented African Ameri-
cans from registering to vote and voting, that provided an avenue for
challenging methods of election that discriminated against minority vot-
ing strength, and that eliminated an English-only election process for
eligible voters who were not proficient in English, resulted in signifi-
cantly changing election practices and procedures throughout the country
in a manner not seen since the First Reconstruction after the Civil War.
84
Yet, while the gains attributable to these sections are substantial, the
of Mobile, Section 2 actions also required proof of a discriminatory intent. Id. Shortly thereafter,
Congress amended Section 2 in 1982. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205,
§ 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134. As a result of these amendments, minority voters challenging at-large meth-
ods of elections are not required to establish a discriminatory intent. Id. The challengers must dem-
onstrate that, based upon a totality of circumstances, minority communities do not have an equal
opportunity to participate in the political process and to elect candidates of their choice. Id.
82.42 U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(1) (2003).
83. Id.
84. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS
ACT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994).
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most dramatic changes in the administration of elections occurred with
the enforcement of another key provision of the 1965 Act: Section 5.
D. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
Perhaps the most significant provision of the 1965 Voting Rights
Act is Section 5.85 Section 5 only applies to certain jurisdictions, includ-
ing many southern states, Texas and Arizona, and four counties in Cali-
fornia.86 A jurisdiction covered by Section 5 must submit any change
affecting voting to the United States Attorney General or the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for a determination that
the proposed change does not result in a retrogression of minority voting
strength and was not adopted pursuant to an intent to retrogress minority
voting strength.8 7 Absent such approval, the voting change cannot be im-
88plemented in any election. Attempts to implement a voting change
without the requisite Section 5 approval will result in an injunction pre-
venting the jurisdiction from conducting an election incorporating the
voting change. 89 The most significant feature of Section 5 is its reversal
of the burden of proof. A jurisdiction submitting a voting change for ap-
proval has the burden of proving non-retrogression of minority voting
strength.90
Since the Section 5 administrative procedure is less expensive and
less time-consuming than litigation, most jurisdictions submit their vot-
ing changes to the United States Attorney General for Section 5 ap-
proval.91 If the Attorney General concludes that the submitting jurisdic-
tion has not met its Section 5 burden, a letter of objection is issued,92
85. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (codified as amended
at42 U.S.C. § 1973c).
86.28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2005).
87. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320 (2000); Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
520 U.S. 471 (1997).
88. Lopez v. Monterey County, 519 U.S. 9, 20 (1996).
89. Id. at 20 ("If a voting change subject to § 5 has not been pre-cleared, § 5 plaintiffs are
entitled to an injunction prohibiting implementation of the change.").
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2003); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(a) (2005).
91. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/about.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005) ("Well over 99 percent of
the changes affecting voting are reviewed administratively, no doubt because of the relative simplic-
ity of the process, the significant cost savings over litigation, and the presence of specific deadlines
governing the Attorney General's issuance of a determination letter."). Compare id. (In a given year,
the Attorney General reviews between "14,000 and 20,000 voting changes.") with U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SECTION 5 DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/
caselistddc.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2005) (listing a total of sixty-nine judicial actions filed to
secure Section 5 approval since 1965).
92. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ABOUT SECTION 5 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, http://
www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/about.htm (last visited Nov. 13, 2005) ("If the jurisdiction is unable
to prove the absence of such discrimination, the District Court denies the requested judgment, or in
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which is the equivalent of a federal court order.93 Upon receipt of this
letter, the jurisdiction is precluded from implementing the voting change
in any elections.94 From June 19, 1968 to June 25, 2004, the Attorney
General issued 1027 letters of objection.95 If these letters had not been
issued, the filing of at least 1027 lawsuits would have been necessary to
achieve the same result.
The positive impact on increasing minority political empowerment,
the result of preventing the implementation of voting changes that had
the potential for discriminating against minority voting strength, cannot
be over-emphasized. For example, in reviewing 222 letters (6 California
letters, 21 Arizona letters, and 195 Texas letters), one can readily ascer-
tain that Latinas/os have experienced significant obstacles having a dis-
criminatory effect on minority voting strength. These obstacles included
a discriminatory statewide purging of voter registration rolls in Texas;
96
annexations that diminished the voting strength of Latinos in San Anto-
nio, Texas97 and Hanford, California;98 county supervisor redistricting
plans that fragmented politically cohesive Latino communities in Mon-
terey County, California;99 congressional and legislative districts that
discriminated against Latino voting strength in Texas; 00 and legislative
districts that fragmented Latino communities in Arizona.'
0'
the case of administrative submissions, the Attorney General objects to the change, and it remains
legally unenforceable."); see also 28 C.F.R. § 51.52(c) (2005).
93. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.10(b) (2005) ("It is unlawful to enforce a change affecting voting with-
out obtaining preclearance under section 5.").
94. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.48(d) (2005) ("An objection remains in effect until either it is with-
drawn by the Attorney General or a declaratory judgment with respect to the change in question is
entered by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.").
95. Study done by, and on file with, author.
96. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Mark
White, Tex. Sec'y of State (Dec. 10, 1975) (on file with author).
97. Letter from J. Stanley Pottinger, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to James
M. Parker, City Attorney, City of San Antonio (Apr. 2, 1976) (on file with author).
98. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Michael J. Noland (Apr. 5, 1993) (on file with author).
99. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Leroy W. Blankenship, Senior Deputy Counsel, Monterey County (Feb. 26, 1993) (on file with
author).
100. Letter from William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice,
to David Dean, Tex. Sec'y of State (Jan. 29, 1982) (on file with author); Letter from William Brad-
ford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to David Dean, Tex. Sec'y of State
(Jan. 25, 1982) (on file with author).
101. Letter from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Lisa T.
Hauser & Josd de Jesfis Rivera (May 20, 2002) (on file with author).
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E. Impact of the Voting Rights Act
The cumulative impact of enforcing the Voting Rights Act of 1965,
coupled with the demographic growth of minority communities in vari-
ous parts of this country, has produced significant increases in minority
political representation. For example, from 1970 to 2000, African
American elected officials increased from 1469 to 9001.102 For Latina/o
elected officials, a study found that there were 1280 Spanish-surnamed
elected officials in 1973 in six states. 0 3 In a 2004 survey of elected offi-
cials, there were about 4800 Latina/o elected officials.10 4 Yet despite this
advancement in minority political representation, problems involving the
denial of access to the political process persist.
The use of at-large elections and their potential dilutive effect on
minority voting strength has been well documented. 0 5 For example, in
California, since the at-large method of election is utilized by ninety per-
cent of about 3,000 local governmental entities to elect their governing
boards, the number of jurisdictions implementing at-large elections is
substantial.°6 In California, this potential dilutive effect may be reflected
102. Carol Hardy-Fanta et al., Race, Gender, and Descriptive Representation: An Exploratory
View of Multicultural Elected Leadership in the United States, Address at the 2005 Annual Meeting
of the American Political Science Association 3 (Sept. 4, 2005).
103. Id.
104. Id. This trend for Latinas/os in Texas is evident in school board officials. In 1985,
Latina/o representation on school boards was 564. NAT'L ASs'N OF LATINO ELECTED AND
APPOINTED OFFICIALS EDUCATIONAL FUND, 1985 NATIONAL ROSTER OF HISPANIC ELECTED
OFFICIALS, at xi (1985). In 2002, the figure was 733. NAT'L ASS'N OF LATINO ELECTED AND
APPOINTED OFFICIALS EDUCATIONAL FUND, 2002 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LATINO ELECTED
OFFICIALS 114 (2002). In 2004, the figure was 759. NAT'L ASS'N OF LATINO ELECTED AND
APPOINTED OFFICIALS, 2004 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LATINO ELECTED OFFICIALS 116 (2004).
105. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 n.13 (1986).
106. As of April 2005, there are a total of 478 municipalities, 108 chartered cities, and 370
general law cities. League of Cal. Cities, Facts at a Glance, http://www.cacities.org/
index.jsp?zone=locc&previewStory=53 (last visited Nov. 13, 2005). Out of the total number of
cities, only 27, or 5.6%, conduct elections by districts. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, COUNCIL
ELECTIONS (2005), http://www.cacities.org/resourcefiles/23513.DISTELEC.doc (last visited Nov.
13, 2005) (The City of Coachella is erroneously listed as conducting district elections.). As of July 1,
2004, there were 979 elementary to high school public school districts. Based upon a 1995 survey,
65% of these districts conduct at-large elections, 20% have candidate residency districts and at-large
voting, and 15% have district elections. Email from Susan Swigart, Director of Member Services,
California School Boards Association, to Joaquin G. Avila, Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle Uni-
versity School of Law (May 17, 2005, 12:27 PST) (on file with author). In a 1987 survey of school
districts, it was estimated that over 95% of school districts conducted their elections on an at-large
election basis. See Bob Johnson, Watsonville 's New Crop, GOLDEN STATE REPORT, Sept. 1989, at
27. Recently, the preliminary results of a survey conducted for a project sponsored by the California
Research Policy Center entitled "Systems of Election, Latino Representation, and Student Outcomes
in California Schools" shows that in fourteen California counties containing significant Latina/o
populations (Tulare (50.8%), San Benito (47.9%), Monterey (46.8), Merced (45.3%), Madera
(44.3%), Fresno (44.0%), Kings (43.6%), Kern (38.4%), Santa Barbara (34.2%), Ventura (33.4%),
Stanislaus (31.7%), San Joaquin (30.5%), Santa Cruz (26.8%) and San Luis Obispo (16.3%)) there
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in the low levels of Latina/o representation on elected governing boards.
Although Latinas/os in 2000 comprised 32.4% of the state's popula-
tion,'°7 in 2004 there were 535 Latinas/os,108 or eleven percent of 4850
elected officials, serving on local school boards'0 9 and there were 357
Latinas/os,11 0 or 14.2% of 2512 elected officials,"' serving on city coun-
cils. Such underrepresentation suggests that many of these at-large meth-
ods of election may have a dilutive effect on minority voting strength.
To summarize, early historical efforts to expand the right to vote
sought to provide physical access to the political process. There were
registration and voting barriers, violence, and devices that prevented and
discouraged African Americans and other minorities from registering to
vote and casting a ballot in support of their preferred candidates. After
the more blatant obstacles were removed, the focus shifted to the impact
of election structures and features that served to discriminate against mi-
nority voting strength. These election structures and features both facili-
tated and magnified the impact of racially polarized voting in determin-
ing the outcome of an election.' 12
are 170 school districts ranging from a 10% Latina/o population concentration to an 86% concentra-
tion that did not have a single Latina/o school board member in 2004. At-large elections were con-
ducted in 168 of those school districts. It is also estimated that there are over 1000 water districts and
over 500 special election districts. Although there are no exact numbers, most of these water districts
and special election districts conduct their elections on an at-large basis.
107. U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Census State & County QuickFacts, California (2000), http://
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
108. NAT'L ASs'N OF LATINO ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS, 2004 NATIONAL
DIRECTORY OF LATINO ELECTED OFFICIALS 22 (2004).
109. Email from Susan Swigart, Director of Member Services, California School Boards Asso-
ciation, to Joaquin G. Avila, Assistant Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law (May 17,
2005, 12:27 PST) (on file with author) (total number of school board members).
110. See 2004 NATIONAL DIRECTORY OF LATINO ELECTED OFFICIALS, supra note 108, at 22.
111. Cal. Sec'y of State-2005 Cal. Roster, http://www.ss.ca.gov/executive/ca roster/ (last
visited Nov. 18, 2005).
112. Voting rights cases have been described in terms of generations. Voting Rights Extension
Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 174 Before the H. Subconn. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. 5-8 (1994) (statement of Dayna L. Cunningham, Assistant
Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.). The first generation of cases involved
the removal of obstacles that prevented eligible voters from physical access to the voter registration
process. Id. at 5. The second generation of cases targeted the operation of election structures and
features on minority voting strength. Id. at 6. This second generation of cases focused on minority
vote dilution issues. Id. The third generation of voting rights cases involves issues of governance. Id.
When a minority is elected to a governing board for the first time, usually there is a change in the
decision-making process that works to the disadvantage of the minority officeholder. Id. For exam-
ple, the placement of items on the agenda may become more burdensome. Id. Thus, if the new pro-
cedure requires a second vote in support of a motion to place an item on the agenda and there is only
one minority elected official, then issues of great concern to the minority community may never be
placed on the agenda for consideration by the governing body. Id. "In Rojas [v. Victoria Indep. Sch.
Dist., No. V-87-16, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11049 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 29, 1998), aff'd, 490 U.S. 1001
(1989)], the first Latino is elected to the school board, and suddenly it requires two votes to get an
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The ongoing efforts to enforce the 1965 Act seek to minimize the
impact of racially polarized voting on the electoral process. Doing so
highlights the importance of having election machinery that does not op-
erate in a discriminatory manner, and thus an inquiry into whether an at-
large election system dilutes minority voting strength, by necessity, will
result in inquiries related to the administration of elections. For example,
if a discriminatory at-large method of election is eliminated, the next
logical inquiry will focus on whether there will be adequate resources
and facilities in minority polling places. The inquiry does not end just
because a given political subdivision now has district elections. Election
districts without adequate polling facilities will discourage voter partici-
pation and turnout.'13 Such low voter participation can have an impact on
elections other than those concerned with the selection of a representa-
tive for that particular election district.
Presently, as a result of the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections,
there is a major election reform movement underway.' 14 This movement
seeks to identify problems in the administration of elections that discour-
item on the agenda. So unless one of the white members of the school board consents, the minority
member can not even put on the agenda for discussion the issues of greatest concern to constituents."
Id. The fourth generation of voting rights cases will deal with issues of election administration and
the minority vote dilution. Id. at 7-8. The fifth generation of voting rights cases will involve restor-
ing the rights of non-citizens to vote in state and local elections. See generally Virginia Harper-Ho,
Noncitizen Voting Rights: The History, the Law and Current Prospects for Change, 18 LAW & INEQ.
271 (2000); see also Joaquin G. Avila, Political Apartheid in California: Consequences of Excluding
a Growing Noncitizen Population, LATINO POL'Y & ISSUES BRIEF (UCLA Chicano Studies Re-
search Ctr.), Dec. 2003. This issue of noncitizen voting is also pertinent to the State of Washington.
For example, in Royal City located in Grant County, about 56.3% of the total number of persons
who are eighteen years and older are noncitizens. JOAQUIN G. AVILA, WASHINGTON CITIES WITH
10% OR MORE 18 YEARS OLD AND OVER NON-CITIZENS 1 (2004) (Source: U.S. Census Bureau,
Census 2000, Summary File 4, Table: GCT-P-16, Citizenship Status for the Population 18 Years and
Over-2000) (study on file with author). The issue of noncitizen voting at the turn of the century
captured the attention of Congress because some states permitted noncitizens to vote upon a declara-
tion of an intent to become a citizen. See Limiting Right to Vote to Citizens of the United States:
Hearing on H.J. Res. 270 before the House Subcommittee No. 1- Civil and Criminal Law of Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, 65th Cong. 4 (Statement of Hon. Andrew J. Montague, Representative from the
State of Virginia).
113. Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Frank McCreary (June 5, 1981) (on file with author) (Letter of Objection issued against the Burleson
County Hospital District in Texas for reducing the number of polling places from thirteen polling
places to one resulting in a drop from about "2,300 voters participating in the 1977 election to ap-
proximately 300 voters participating in [the] 1979 and 1980 elections.").
114. See generally U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, VOTING IRREGULARITIES IN FLORIDA
DURING THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (June 2001) (2000 presidential elections); HOUSE
JUDICIARY COMM. DEMOCRATIC STAFF, PRESERVING DEMOCRACY: WHAT WENT WRONG IN OHIO
(2005) (2004 presidential elections) [hereinafter PRESERVING DEMOCRACY]; FED. COMM'N ON
ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2005) (87 recommendations for
election reform).
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age and prevent eligible voters from exercising their vote.1'5 By address-
ing these maladministration issues, the electoral process will become
more accessible.' 1 6 In a similar fashion, addressing issues of minority
access to the political process will inevitably lead to an inquiry regarding
the administration of elections. 1 7 As a result of this congruence in objec-
tives, there is a historic opportunity to significantly improve minority
access to the political process and at the same time improve the admini-
stration of elections.
Thus, the 2004 gubernatorial election presents an opportunity that
can have far reaching effects in providing racial and ethnic minorities
with greater access to the political process. By focusing on efforts to im-
prove the administration of elections, inquiries regarding the fairness of
certain election procedures and methods of election will inevitably arise.
Only by addressing issues of minority access to the political process in
conjunction with efforts to improve the administration of elections can
we hope to strengthen the body politic.
This symposium issue will not only deal with the problems con-
fronting election administrators in preparing and executing a flawless
election, but also will highlight those areas where this convergence of
reform interests-interests between those who seek an election system
that does not discriminate and those who want an election machinery that
restores public confidence in the electoral process-can synergistically
produce a political environment that requires the election machinery not
only to run well, but to encourage groups that heretofore have been ex-
115. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 14.
116. Improving the administration of elections will result in fewer obstacles that inhibit voter
participation. For example, by streamlining the voting process and facilitating the use of voting by
mail, voting participation rates can increase. In Oregon, all voting is conducted by mail. Voting in
Oregon Guide, http://www.uhavavote.org/votingguide/votebymail.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2005).
As noted on the Secretary of State's website: "All elections in Oregon are Vote by Mail. This means
that registered voters receive their ballots in the mail and can vote in the comfort of their home." Id.
As a result of this accessible voting process, voter turnout in Oregon elections is among the highest
in the nation. During the 2004 general election, the percent of registered voters voting was 86.48%.
STATISTICAL SUMMARY: 2004 GENERAL ELECTION 1 (2004), http://www.sos.state.or.us/elections/
nov22004/g04stats.pdf. In comparison, for the same election in California, where voting is permitted
by other means, the percent of registered voters voting was 76.04%. COMPARATIVE VOTER
REGISTRATION AND VOTER PARTICIPATION STATISTICS FOR STATEWIDE GENERAL ELECTIONS-
1910-2004, at 2, http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/sov/2004_general/sovpref pgs9_l0 compare
stats_ 1910_2004.pdf.
117. For example, in addressing issues of insufficient voting machines in minority neighbor-
hoods, questions regarding election administration policies will arise. PRESERVING DEMOCRACY,
supra note 114, at 24-31, 102. Inquiries will be directed toward assessing whether there are any
valid criteria or standards in support of the present method of allocating voting machines. Id. at 24-
31. A review of such policies will result in a more efficient Election Day operation. Id.; see also
Count Every Vote Act of 2005, S. 450, 109th Cong. § 299 (2005) ("Standards for Establishing the
Minimum Required Voting Systems and Poll Workers").
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cluded from the political process to enter the political arena and become
a vested stakeholder in their communities. It is in this context that the
2004 gubernatorial contest must be placed.
Ill. THE UNFOLDING OF AN ELECTORAL AND POLITICAL CRISIS
The 2004 presidential election was expected to be close." 8 The
State of Washington's gubernatorial election was also expected to be
close 9-but not this close. After the initial count on Election Day, No-
vember 2, 2004, Gregoire was ahead by 32 votes out of 1.8 million
counted. 120 However, a significant number of absentee and provisional 121
ballots remained to be counted. 122 On November 3rd the lead widened to
14,300 votes out of 2 million votes counted, 123 and increased to about
18,000 votes the following day. 124 As the absentee balloting and provi-
sional balloting commenced, the lead was reduced to about 4000 votes. 125
However, shortly thereafter, the lead was extended to 8700 votes. 126 A
sharp reversal occurred the following week after additional absentee
votes were counted: Rossi assumed close to a 3000 vote lead. 127 As the
counting continued, Rossi's lead increased to about 3500 votes, 128 and
118. Adam Nagourney et al., The 2004 Campaign: The Polls; In Final Days Before Vote,
Divided Electorate Expresses Anxiety and Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2004, at A16 ("The poll
shows that Mr. Bush and his opponent, Senator John Kerry, remain locked in a statistical tie as they
head into the final 48 hours of the race.").
119. Brad Knickerbocker, Washington Among Tight Governor's Races, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2004, at 2 (Washington State gubernatorial election called toss-up); David Am-
mons, Voter Turnout Could Set Washington Record, THE COLUMBIAN, Oct. 31, 2004, at C (polls
before election showed either a tie or a slight lead for each candidate).
120. State Election Results, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at B14; Ralph Thomas, Gregoire,
Rossi Race Comes Down to Wire, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 3, 2004, at B I.
121. See HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5,
10, 36, and 42 U.S.C.).
122. State Election Results, supra note 120; Joni Baiter, Gregoire Campaigns Gives Dems
Something to Chew on, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at B6 ("Gregoire's best hope lies with per-
haps 100,000 provisional ballots statewide and other outstanding ballots in King, Whatcom and
Thurston counties.").
123. David Postman, Gregoire vs. Rossi: Why It's So Close, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at
Al; Ralph Thomas, Gregoire Edges Ahead of Rossi; Potential for Recount Looms, SEATTLE TIMES,
Nov. 4, 2004, at A12.
124. Ralph Thomas & Andrew Garber, King County Absentees Widen Lead for Gregoire,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 5, 2004, at B 1.
125. Ralph Thomas, Gregoire's Lead over Rossi Slips to 4,000, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6, 2004,
at B4.
126. Ralph Thomas & Susan Gilmore, King County Absentees Push Gregoire's Lead to 8,700
Votes, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 9, 2004, at B 1.
127. Ralph Thomas, Rossi Ahead, Names Team for Possible Transition, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
10, 2004, at Al.
128. Ralph Thomas & Keith Ervin, Rossi Maintains Lead; Gregoire Holds Out Hope, SEATTLE
TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at BI.
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then inched up to 3600 votes on November 11 th.129 Given the tightness
of the contest, disputes over ballot counting were inevitable.
A. The Initial Disputes
The first major dispute concerned provisional ballots. King County
found signature problems with about 900 provisional ballots. 130 Democ-
ratic Party officials had requested the names of the voters who had
signed the provisional ballots in order to assist in correcting any prob-
lems identified by county officials. 13 There were also charges of intimi-
dation of election officials as they counted these provisional ballots, lev-
eled against the representatives of the Republican Party. 32
The counting continued and the litigation commenced. Representa-
tives of the Democratic Party initiated litigation in King County Superior
Court to secure the names of the voters who voted on provisional ballots
and whose ballots presented problems with election officials. 133 Although
initially reluctant to provide the names of these voters on the grounds
that HAVA 34 precluded such a disclosure, the county provided these
names after the superior court granted a temporary restraining order re-
quested by the Democratic Party officials. 135 The superior court con-
cluded that there was no specific prohibition relating to the disclosure of
the names of persons who voted with provisional ballots. 136 Moreover, it
appeared that King County was the only major county which refused to
disclose such names.' 37 In other counties, such names were a matter of
public record and were provided to both Democratic and Republican
Party officials.' 38 Accordingly, the superior court ordered county election
officials to release these names to both parties. 139 After securing this
court Order, the Democratic Party officials were hopeful of securing ad-





133. Wash. State Democratic Cent. Comm. v. King County Records, Elections & Licensing
Servs. Div., No. 04-2-36048-0-SEA (King County Super. Ct., Wash. filed Nov. 12, 2004).
134. HAVA, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 10, 36,
and 42 U.S.C.).
135. Wash. State Democratic Cent. Comm., No. 04-2-36048-0-SEA (Nov. 12, 2004) (order
granting Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Other Relief); id. (Nov. 16, 2004) (order
reaffirming previous order and denying other requested relief).
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ditional votes for Gregoire. 14 As a result of the Order, Democratic Party
officials and volunteers contacted voters across the county in an attempt
to have their votes counted.141
As the counting continued, more ballots were found in King
County. Initially projecting an uncounted ballot total of about 11,000,
King County election officials stated that in fact the number of un-
counted absentee and provisional ballots totaled about 21,000.142 The
explanation given by county officials related to the higher than expected
number of voters who voted by absentee ballots. 143 In addition there were
more provisional ballots found to be valid. 144 These additional votes,
which came from a county leaning in favor of the Democratic Party,
served to eliminate the margin of victory that Rossi had maintained for a
few days. 145 As a result of these ballots, Rossi was now trailing by 158
votes. 146 The Rossi campaign expressed major concerns regarding the
discrepancy of 10,000 votes between projected estimates and the actual
vote count, especially since the newly adjusted figures were released just
two days before the official certification. 47 The counting of ballots con-
tinued. About two days before the election was scheduled to be certified,
Rossi was leading by nineteen votes, with about 6000 ballots to be
counted. 148 After the counting was completed, Rossi was ahead statewide
by a mere 261 votes out of 2.8 million votes counted. 149
140. Susan Gilmore et al., Rossi Leading; Gregoire Allies Win in Court, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
13, 2004, at Al.
141. Judy Chia Hui Hsu, Parties Chase After Every Vote, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004, at
BI.
142. Ralph Thomas & Keith Ervin, Governor's Race Going Back and Forth, SEATTLE TIMES,
Nov. 16, 2004, at B I.
143. Id. According to election officials, the higher number of returned absentee ballots was due
to "late returns from voters overseas or serving in the armed forces." Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. In the interim, Democratic Party officials were securing affidavits from those voters
identified by King County officials as having cast questionable provisional and absentee ballots. Id.
On November 15th, Democratic Party officials handed in about 400 affidavits from these voters. Id.
Such votes were deemed to favor Gregoire. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Apparently the discrepancy occurred as a result of a change in the pre-election pro-
jected voter turnout figure. The original pre-election projected voter turnout, as it turned out, was
more accurate. Keith Ervin, "Sudden " County Ballots Were There All Along, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
17, 2004, at A 13.
148. Ralph Thomas et al., Governor's Race in Turmoil, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 17, 2004, at Al.
In addition, to add to the drama, "election officials in Grays Harbor County announced a recount of
its ballots because some votes had been counted twice." Id. This particular recount resulted in hun-
dreds of votes being taken away from Rossi. Id.
149. Ralph Thomas et al., It's Rossi by 261; Recount Is Next, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004,
at AI.
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B. The First Recount
Due to the small vote margin, a mandatory machine recount was
conducted. 5 ° The machine recount was closely monitored-just about
every vote tally was scrutinized' 5 '-and resulted in the filing of the first
lawsuit.152 The Republican Party filed a lawsuit in federal court challeng-
ing the recounting of votes in King County. The litigation sought an or-
der preventing King County election officials from enhancing or dupli-
cating a ballot when the optical scan vote counting machines rejected
it.153 When such an event occurs, election officials review the ballot and
if the intent of the voter can be ascertained then the election officials
prepare a duplicate ballot or enhance the ballot to reflect the voter's in-
tent. Once completed, the enhanced or duplicate ballot is added to the
vote tally. 154 The effort by the Republican Party to halt the counting of
these challenged ballots was unsuccessful-the District Court Judge de-
nied the requested relief. Since the ballots were being preserved, there
were additional opportunities to review the validity of these ballots. A
subsequent request for a preliminary injunction was also denied.1
55
The machine recount also resulted in the additional votes being tal-
lied that were not included in the initial count. For example, in Snoho-
mish County, election officials "accidentally overlooked" 242 absentee
ballots that had not been counted. 56 This oversight was due to the stack-
ing of an empty tray on top of another tray containing ballots.'5 7
As the votes were received from the machine recount, on November
23rd Rossi's lead widened to 321 votes, with the vote tallying of two
150. Id. Lost in the ongoing gubernatorial election drama was the fact that the statewide voter
turnout was 82.13%, a noteworthy accomplishment. Id. For the statutory authority for a recount see
supra note 17.
151. Peggy Andersen, Klickitat Finishes Recount; Rossi Picks Up a Vote, SEATTLE TIMES,
Nov. 21, 2004, at B2 ("Rossi added one [vote] in Klickitat County, the first of the 39 counties to
report recount results.").
152. Wash. State Republican Party v. Reed, No. C04-2350RSM (W.D. Wash. filed Nov. 11,
2004); see also Steve Miletich & Brier Dudley, GOP Files Suit over Recount Governor's Race, King
County Workers' Methods Called Improper, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 21, 2004, at B I. The Republican
Party did not file similar suits in other counties. Id.
153. Miletich & Dudley, supra note 152.
154. Id. Under former administrative code sections, election officials had the authority to en-
hance and duplicate ballots that reflected a voter's intent but were not clearly legible. WASH. ADMIN.
CODE 434-261-080 to 090 (2004), repealed by 05-17 Wash. Reg. 199 (Aug. 19, 2005).
155. Ralph Thomas, All Eyes on State Recount, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at Al; Lynn
Thompson, Judge Says No to GOP, Won't Halt Recount, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at B 1. The
case was subsequently dismissed voluntarily. Wash. State Republican Party, No. C04-2350RSM
(Nov. 29, 2004) (order granting voluntary dismissal).




counties still outstanding. 158 One of the outstanding counties was King
County, where Gregoire was expected to pick up votes. 59 However, ul-
timately the votes in King County were not enough for Gregoire. Rossi
won the machine recount vote by forty-two votes.16 In King County, the
machine recount resulted in the counting of an additional 1000 ballots
that were not counted before. 161 On November 30th, the Secretary of
State certified the results of the machine recount.' 62
C. The Second Recount
After the certification of the machine recount, the Democratic Party
exercised another procedure available in the election code. The Democ-
ratic Party sought a manual statewide recount.163 This procedure was ini-
tiated by providing a check for $730,000 to the Secretary of State's of-
fice on December 3, 2004.164
In conjunction with the statewide hand recount, the Democratic
Party and voters filed a writ of mandamus directly with the Washington
State Supreme Court seeking the establishment of uniform standards for
counting ballots during the recount. 165 The writ alleged that ballots re-
jected in the previous counts should be reviewed again utilizing uniform
standards that would assure that all ballots validly cast were counted. 166
The supreme court rejected the argument and held that a manual recount
158. Ralph Thomas, King County Holds Key as Tally Nears End, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 24,
2004, at Al.
159. Id. With two counties' results outstanding, five counties had counted "100 additional
votes or more compared with their initial tallies." Id.
160. Ralph Thomas, A Governor by Christmas?, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 25, 2004, at Al.
161. Id. These additional votes were "due to voter errors or ballot irregularities." Id.
162. Susan Gilmore & David Postman, Rossi Named Governor-Elect; Funds Flowing to De-
mocrats for New Count, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 2004, at Al.
163. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.64.011 (2004).
164. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.64.030 (2004) (manual recount requires a deposit based upon
the votes cast in the election); see also Andrew Garber & David Postman, Statewide Recount Next
Week, Dems Sue over Rejected Ballots, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 4, 2004, at Al.
165. Petitioners' Motion and Brief in Support of Emergency Partial Relief, McDonald v. Reed,
153 Wash. 2d 201, 103 P.3d 722 (2004) (No. 76321-6). Although at loggerheads during the litigation
and hand recounts, there was at least one moment of agreement between the Democratic and Repub-
lican Parties, and election officials. As a result of reaching an agreement, the counties of Snohomish
and Yakima would not be required to print out their ballots from computer tapes. Instead, the coun-
ties could use the computer tapes during the hand recount. Emily Heffter, Two Counties to Use
Tapes in Recount, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 9, 2004, at B4.
166. Petitioners' Motion and Brief in Support of Emergency Partial Relief at 16-19, Petition-
ers' Motion and Brief in Support of Emergency Partial Relief, McDonald, 153 Wash. 2d 201, 103
P.3d 722.
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involved a "retabulating" of ballots cast, and thus those ballots that were
rejected would not be counted in the hand recount. 167
Predictably, as the hand recount unfolded, counties found ballots
that had not been counted. In Whatcom County, seven ballots had been
placed with a stack of empty envelopes. 68 In Skamania County, several
ballots were discovered which were not properly read by optical scan
equipment. 69 In Mason County, the specter of ballot chads appeared to
play a role in the hand recount when ballots that were punched had not
been counted. 70 And in Wahkiakum County, when asked to explain the
discrepancy of one vote between the previous counts and the hand re-
count, the county auditor stated: "I don't know." 17'
And, predictably, the genesis of a second major state supreme court
case began. Initially, the returns of the more populated counties were
awaited with a collective anticipation that the results would bring an end
to this ongoing political saga. However, such an expectation soon evapo-
rated as voters noticed that their votes were not counted in King County.
One of those voters was King County Councilman Larry Phillips. Coun-
cilman Phillips had voted absentee in the election. His ballot was rejected
because there was no matching signature on file to verify his signature.
Councilman Phillips' discovery prompted election officials in King
County to search for more ballots that were rejected on this ground. 72 If
there was no matching signature in the computer system, the appropriate
course would have been to check the signatures on the voter registration
cards. 173 The search found 561 ballots that had not been disqualified in
accordance with this procedure. In essence, these voters were being pe-
167. Id. at 203-06, 103 P.3d at 723-24. The petitioners also challenged the absence of any
standards for reviewing signatures on absentee ballots and provisional ballots consistent with "the
more liberal standards applied in most counties" and the absence of "standards that allow party rep-
resentatives to meaningfully witness the hand recount, by observing all actual ballots being
counted." Id. at 203, 103 P.3d at 723. Both of these requests for relief were denied. Id. at 206, 103
P.3d at 724; see also Jim Downing, Party Faithful to Tally Ballots, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, at
Al (discussing King County's hand recount process and standards).
168. Andrew Garber, New Votes Emerge in Recount, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 10, 2004, at B 1. In
Kitsap County, the hand recount resulted in an additional 161 votes. Keith Ervin, Rossi Keeps Slim
Lead as Recount Crawls On; Extra Ballots Show Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 11, 2004, at B 1. The
county auditor attributed the difference to the use of lightly colored ink in marking electoral prefer-
ences. Id.
169. See Garber, supra note 168. Apparently, voters used a pencil to mark their preferences,
instead of a pen.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Jennifer Sullivan, Councilman 's Ballot Among Those Rejected, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 31,
2004, at B 1.
173. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.40.110(3) (2005); David Postman, Error Discovery Could Give
Gregoire Election, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A 1.
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nalized because their signature had not been entered into the computer
system.
Before a second state supreme court challenge was pursued, how-
ever, a "nuclear option" surfaced which threatened to completely bypass
the electoral process. 74 Under a rarely used provision of the state's con-
stitution, the issue of selecting the next governor could be resolved by
the legislature. Article III, Section 4 states: "Contested elections for such
officers [governor and other state elected officials specified in Section 1]
shall be decided by the legislature in such manner as shall be determine
by law."' 175 Since both houses of the legislature would each consist of a
majority of Democrats after newly elected members were sworn into the
senate, Gregoire would likely benefit from the pursuit of such a legisla-
tive strategy.176 For the moment, the nuclear option was not engaged and
the hand recount continued. As of December 14th, the results of the hand
recount provided Rossi with a 106 vote lead.17
7
However, the Republican elation over Rossi's sixty-four vote net
increase over Gregoire in the hand recount was tempered by the continu-
ing discovery of ballots that were not counted in King County. Election
officials discovered twenty-two uncounted ballots located in pockets of
voting machines placed in storage. 7 8 Since these ballots were not
counted, the Republican Party contended that the ballots were not prop-
erly secured and thus should remain uncounted. 179 The discovery of these
additional ballots added to the 561 ballots that were rejected because of
the absence of a signature on the county's computerized voting sys-
tem.'80 On December 14th, the county revised the figure to 573.18 Thus,
as of December 14th, the total number of ballots that were not initially
counted in King County was 595.182 The following day, the county can-
vassing board' 83 voted along party lines to permit election officials to
174. David Postman, Will Legislature Pick Governor? It Could Happen, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec.
15, 2004, at Al.
175. WASH. CONST. art. III, § 4.
176. Postman, supra note 173.
177. Governor Recount, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 15, 2004, at Al (as of December 14th, Rossi
had gained a net of 64 votes over Gregoire in the hand recount).






183. The county canvassing board consists of three members: the county auditor, the county
prosecuting attorney, and the chair of the county's legislative delegation. WASH. REV. CODE §
29A.60.140(1) (2004). The canvassing board has the authority to review challenges to registered
voters and ballots cast and to certify the results of elections. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.60.140(1),
(3).
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review the 573 ballots that were previously rejected because of the ab-
sence of a signature on the county's computer voting system. 184 The re-
view would permit election officials to verify the signatures with those
signatures located on the county's voter registration cards.1"5 Such a de-
cision would be of great significance since on the evening of December
15th, Rossi led Gregoire by 121 votes. 86
Accordingly, the Republican Party sought judicial review of King
County's canvassing board's decision to permit review of the disputed
573 ballots. 87 The Superior Court for Pierce County issued a Temporary
Restraining Order and Order to Show Cause on December 17, 2004, pre-
venting King County election officials from proceeding with the can-
vassing of the previously rejected ballots. 188 At issue was whether state
law permitted canvassing boards to count ballots that were previously
rejected and, if so, under what circumstances such ballots could be
counted. 89 In reversing the superior court, the state supreme court held
that the canvassing board did have the authority to count ballots that had
previously been rejected under a very limited set of circumstances. 190
According to the supreme court, the failure to count ballots on the basis
of a mistake committed by election officials qualifies as an "apparent
discrepancy or inconsistency that the board can correct through recan-
vassing.'' 9 Election officials should have verified the signatures of the
disputed ballots with the signatures on file on the voter registration cards.
184. David Postman, Cascading Errors Shake Voter Confidence, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 16,
2004, at AI; Keith Ervin & Susan Gilmore, New Look at 573 Ballots May Close Gregoire Gap, 2-1
Splits King County Board, GOP Threatens Legal Action Over Decision on Rejected Ballots,
SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at Al.
185. As of December 15th, election officials had matched signatures for 245 of the disputed
ballots. Moreover, 101 of the voters casting these disputed ballots had not responded to a previous
letter requesting an updated signature. The canvassing board also withheld a decision on whether to
count 22 ballots found in the pockets of voting machines and reviewed additional problem ballots
identified by the hand recount officials. Ervin & Gilmore, supra note 184.
186. Id. As the recount continued, each ballot was carefully scrutinized. In at least one in-
stance, the imprint of a squashed bug nearly derailed the counting of one ballot. Apparently the
ballot had a filled-in oval for Rossi and a "smudge" in the oval for Gregoire. Upon close inspection,
the smudge turned out to be a squashed bug. Danny Westneat, Counter For a Day Finds Few Bugs
in Recount Process, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at Al.
187. Wash. State Republican Party v. King County Div. of Records, No. 04-2-14599-1 (Pierce
County Super. Ct., Wash. filed Dec. 16, 2004); Wash. State Republican Party v. King County Div.
of Records, 153 Wash. 2d 220, 221-22, 103 P.3d 725, 726 (2004).
188. Wash. State Republican Party, No. 04-2-14599-1 (Dec. 17, 2004) (order granting tempo-
rary restraining order); Wash. State Republican Party, 153 Wash. 2d at 222, 103 P.3d at 726.
189. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.60.210 (2004) ("Whenever the canvassing board finds that there
is an apparent discrepancy or an inconsistency in the returns of a primary or election, the board may
recanvass the ballots or voting devices in any precincts of the county.").
190. Wash. State Republican Party, 153 Wash. 2d 220, 103 P.3d 725.
191. Id. at 225, 103 P.3d at 728.
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As a result of the court's decision, King County could continue to
review the disputed ballots. Without incorporating the results of the dis-
puted ballots, the result of the manual recount resulted in a ten vote vic-
tory for Gregoire. 192 After King County completed the recanvassing of
the disputed ballots, Gregoire's lead increased to 130 votes. 193 The final
tally was reduced by one vote to 129 votes. 194 The results of the hand
recount were certified by the Secretary of State on December 30th. 95
In the meantime, the Republican Party continued its inquiry into
voter irregularities in King County. The Republican Party pointed out
that there were 3539 more ballots cast than there were registered vot-
ers. 196 In response, by way of explanation, King County's election super-
intendent stated that in some instances persons who were not eligible to
vote may have cast a provisional ballot and inserted it into the vote
counting machine instead of having the provisional ballot separated from
the other ballots.' 97 This would account for some of the discrepancy.
However, there was no way of undoing the damage.'
98
After the election was certified, the Secretary of State proposed a
series of legislative reforms to restore public confidence in state elec-
tions.' 99 His proposals requested that the state's primary election date be
moved to June, rather than conducting the primary in early September.
20 0
An earlier date for the primary election would provide sufficient time for
election officials to prepare for the subsequent general election. The Sec-
retary also proposed that absentee ballots should be either postmarked no
later than the Friday preceding the election or be received no later than
Election Day.z0 ' In an effort to ease the financial strain experienced by
192. David Postman & Ralph Thomas, Gregoire Leads by 10, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 23, 2004,
at Al. The recanvassing by the county canvassing board includes additional ballots identified by
election officials as eligible for consideration by the board. The total ballots to be reviewed now
climbed to 735. Id.
193. David Postman, It's Gregoire by 130; Is It Over?, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 24, 2004, at Al.
After the results were announced Republican Party officials called for a new election and sent in-
quiries to various county canvassing boards seeking information regarding problems associated with
the counting of ballots. Editorial, State Can't Handle a New Election, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 30,
2004, at B6.
194. Ralph Thomas, Rossi Urges Revote to Fix "Mess, " SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 30, 2004, at Al.
195. A Look Back at 58-day Wait and 3 Counts, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at Al 8.
196. Keith Ervin, Provisional- Vote Flaws Revealed, Some Ballots Bypassed Inspection,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 5, 2005, at B1; Keith Ervin, GOP: Hundreds of Ballots Suspect, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at B1. There were additional allegations of votes cast by persons who were
dead. However, the number of such fraudulently cast votes was small. Jonathan Martin & David
Heath, Voting by Dead People Isn't Always a Scam, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at Al.
197. See Ervin, Provisional-Vote Flaws Revealed, supra note 196.
198. Id.
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counties, the Secretary proposed that the state finance the cost of re-
counts conducted in even-numbered years and that funds be provided for
202training programs. In addition, the proposed reforms would require
county auditors to inform voters in writing that their ballots were not
counted as a result of receiving the ballots after Election Day.20 3 How-
ever, these reforms were presented in a political climate where the out-
come of the election was not officially over.
D. The Election Contest
The expected election contest by supporters of the Republican Party
gubernatorial candidate, Dino Rossi, was filed on January 7, 2005.204 The
election contest raised a variety of issues that included improper handling
of provisional ballots, discrepancies between the voter lists and the num-
ber of ballots cast, illegal votes by convicted felons who had not had
their right to vote restored, mishandling of overseas military ballots, and,
most significantly, lack of uniform standards for counting and ballot
verification among the counties.205 Although the election contest was
filed against election officials, 2 0 6 representatives of the Democratic and
Libertarian Parties soon intervened. 07
The filing of the election contest set the political tone for the drama
unfolding in the state legislature. Rossi supporters sought to postpone
any legislative imprimatur on the election of Gregoire as the governor.20 8
The legislative maneuvering was accompanied by dueling public rallies,
each group supporting their preferred candidate with their respective slo-
gans: "'ILLEGAL VOTES = ILLEGITIMATE RESULTS' and 'This
isn't Ukraine, it's Washington"' for the Republicans versus "'We've had
a close, but a fair election. It's now time to move on ' ' 20 9 for the Democ-
rats. At the same time, election officials in King County were making
202. Id
203. Id.
204. Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Wash. filed Jan.
7, 2005); see also David Postman et al., GOP Suit Doesn't Ask to Prevent Swearing-In, SEATTLE
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2005, at Al. According to the article, there had never been a successful election con-
test involving a statewide office. Id.
205. Borders, No. 05-2-00027-3. With respect to overseas military ballots, the federal govern-
ment had applied pressure on the counties to send out the ballots in a timely manner. David Postman
& Ralph Thomas, Feds Threatened Suit over Military Ballots, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at Al.
206. See Borders, No. 05-2-00027-3.
207. Washington State Democratic Central Committee's Motion to Intervene, Borders, No. 05-
2-00027-3; see also, David Postman, Democrats Challenge GOP Lawsuit, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 12,
2005, at B2; Election-suit Judge Recuses Self SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al 3 (approval of
Libertarian Party intervention).
208. David Postman & Andrew Garber, Legislature Opens With a Battle, GOP Fails in Bid to
Delay Declaring Gregoire Governor, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at B 1.
209. Id.
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adjustments to their ballot discrepancies, which only added ammunition
to the efforts to invalidate the election.21 ° Ultimately, the state legislature
certified Christine Gregoire as the winner of the election, 211 and she had
her inaugural ball.' 12
After the festivities subsided, attention returned to the election con-
test. Attention focused on allegations that there were a large number of
illegal votes cast by felons, discrepancies between the number of ballots
cast and the actual number of registered voters, and the mishandling of
provisional ballots.1 3 Initial discovery efforts were opposed by the De-
mocratic Party representatives. The Democratic Party sought to have
several jurisdictional questions addressed before any extensive discovery
could be commenced. These questions included the following: whether
(1) the state legislature was the appropriate governmental body to resolve
this statewide office election dispute; (2) the state supreme court was the
appropriate court to decide this election contest; (3) the petition's allega-
tions were within the purview of the election contest statute; and (4) the
request for a new election was authorized under state laws.2 4 While
these discovery and jurisdictional questions were being considered, at-
tention continued to focus on the votes cast by felons whose right to vote
had not been restored in accordance with applicable state law. 215 While
210. Keith Ervin, New Error Found in Vote Tally, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 11, 2005, at B 1.
211. Ralph Thomas & Andrew Garber, 2 Sides Rally on Eve oflnaugural, SEATTLE TIMES,
Jan. 12, 2005, at B1.
212. Christina Siderius, Turmoil Put Aside at Ball Honoring Governor, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
13, 2005, at A13.
213. David Postman, GOP Seeks Criminal Records, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 14, 2005, at A].
214. Washington State Democratic Central Committee's Opposition to Petitioners' Motion for
Expedited Discovery, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Thurston County Super. Ct.,
Wash. filed Jan. 7, 2005). As additional support for staying discovery in the election contest, the
Democratic Party representatives contended that the filing of four other separate election contests,
three directly with the Washington Supreme Court and one in Kitsap County, required coordination
in order to avoid burdensome discovery resulting from repeated requests for the same information.
Id. In a subsequent ruling, the superior court denied the petitioners' request for expedited discovery
and also denied the Democratic Party representatives' motion to suspend discovery until the jurisdic-
tional questions were resolved. David Postman, GOP Loses Round in Election Case, Judge Also
Deals Democrats a Setback, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at B I.
215. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.066 (2003). A newspaper study found that "scores" of
ineligible felons voted in the contested gubernatorial election. Scores of Felons Voted Illegally,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 23, 2005, at Al. In response to this study, county prosecutors initially ex-
pressed reservations about initiating any criminal proceedings against these persons. Mike Carter,
Crackdown Unlikely on Felon Voters, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 25, 2005, at Al. But as more reports
surfaced, some county prosecutors began investigations. David Postman & Cheryl Phillips, Probe of
Felon Voters Not Yet Started, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 25, 2005, at Al ("Prosecutors in [counties other
than King County] have begun investigations."). Finally prosecutors in King County sought to re-
voke the registration of those felons who were not eligible to vote. Mike Carter, Voter-List Purge
Targets 99 Felons, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at Al; see also Mike Carter, 99 Felons Purged
From Voter Rolls, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 25, 2005, at B5 (an additional 93 felons would be chal-
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the legal questions were being debated and investigations into voting by
ineligible felons continued, the public debate took a turn for the worse
when the media reported that a person had been arrested for making a
death threat against Governor Gregoire. 216 Despite this public contro-
versy, the judicial proceedings continued.
On February 4th, the superior court issued a series of rulings which
addressed the jurisdictional questions raised by the Democratic Party
representatives and that served to limit the scope of relief to be provided
by the court.217 With respect to the issue of whether an election contest
for an office elected on a statewide basis should be heard only by the
state legislature, the court stated that superior courts also had jurisdiction
to hear these actions.21 8 The state legislature did have the authority to
hear such election contests; however, such authority could be delegated,
219and in fact was delegated, to the state's courts. With respect to the is-
sue of whether the election contest should have been brought in the first
instance with the state supreme court, the court concluded that superior
courts have jurisdiction over these election contests . 2 ° As to the claim
that the petitioners' allegations were not within the purview of the elec-
tion contest statutes, the court in effect ruled that the allegations could be
maintained in this action and permitted the case to proceed to trial.221 The
court also ruled that petitioners' request for a new election, despite a
state court's inherent equitable powers, was not authorized under either
lenged). As the discovery period progressed in the election contest, the Republican Party representa-
tives found more votes cast by ineligible felons. David Postman, Republicans Say They've Found
249 More Felons Who Voted, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 29, 2005, at B2; see also Associated Press, Re-
publicans Allege /, 108 Felons Voted Illegally in Election, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 23, 2005, at B2;
GOP Delivers "Felon Voters" List, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at Al. Later, the Republican
Party representatives acknowledged that "perhaps hundreds" of the 1135 names on the list provided
to the media and the parties in the election contest may have been improperly included. David Post-
man, GOP's Felon List May Be Way Off, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 17, 2005, at Al.
216. Ralph Thomas, Threat to Gregoire Brings Arrest; State Guarding Rossi, Too, SEATTLE
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2005, at B I ("[Gregoire] hinted some of the threats were being spawned by the con-
troversy surrounding her election, which is still being contested by Rossi."). Unfortunately, the level
of discourse can reach very shrill levels and has historically resulted in violence and death when
controversies surrounding the right to vote arose. See sources supra note 37 and accompanying text;
see also Paul Hendrickson, Editorial, Mississippi Yearning, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2005, at A19 (de-
scribing the eventual state court criminal proceedings against Ku Klux Klan members who were
involved in the murders of James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner, three civil
rights workers conducting voter registration activities in African American communities near Phila-
delphia, Mississippi).
217. Transcript of Court's Oral Decision, Borders, No. 05-2-00027-3 (Thurston County Super.
Ct., Wash. Feb. 4, 2005); David Postman, GOP Lawsuit Heads to Trial, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 5,
2005, at Al.
218. Transcript of Court's Oral Decision at 4-9, Borders, No. 05-2-00027-3.
219. Id. at 9.
220. Id. at 10-12.
221. Id. at 18-29.
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the state's constitution or its election contest statute.222 In addition, the
court dismissed the counties and the respective county auditors from the
case. 2
23
Following these rulings, preparations for trial continued. The major
issue remaining for the court to address related to petitioners' burden of
proof in demonstrating that the number of illegal votes would have af-
fected the outcome of the election. An interpretation of a state statute
governing election contests would be integral to the court's ruling. Ac-
cording to the statute:
No election may be set aside on account of illegal votes, unless it
appears that an amount of illegal votes has been given to the per-
son whose right is being contested, that, if taken from that per-
son, would reduce the number of the person's legal votes below
the number of votes given to some other person for the same of-
fice, after deducting therefrom the illegal votes that may be
shown to have been given to the other person.224
The key issue in interpreting the statute was whether the plain lan-
guage of the statute required petitioners to prove that the challenged bal-
lots would have changed the outcome of the election.225 Should that be
the case, the Republican petitioners would first be required to show that a
vote was cast illegally, and then prove that the illegal vote was cast for
the certified winner, Christine Gregoire. The court invited further argu-
ment on this issue prior to the commencement of trial.226 In a later pro-
ceeding, the date for trial was set as May 23, 2005.227
222. Id. at 29-32. As a result of the court's ruling on this issue, there was confusion regarding
the scope of the remedy available in this election contest. The issue was whether the court could
simply install Rossi as the state's governor in the event that the petitioners prevailed, or whether the
court could declare the election void, thereby creating a vacancy that the legislature could fill with a
special election. See Postman, supra note 217; David Postman, Rossi Declares Self Winner in Latest
Round of Court Fight, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 8, 2005, at B 1.
223. Transcript of Court's Oral Decision at 14-16, Borders, No. 05-2-00027-3.
224. WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.68.110 (2004).
225. Transcript of Court's Oral Decision, Borders, No. 05-2-00027-3.
226. David Postman, Judge Sides With GOP Over Election Lawsuit, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 19,
2005, at B1. At the February 4th hearing, the court stated that such a literal interpretation would
make the case more problematic for the petitioners. However, at this stage of the proceedings the
court held that it was sufficient to allege that illegal votes were cast. Transcript of Court's Oral Deci-
sion at 23, Borders, No. 05-2-00027-3. As the pre-trial proceedings progressed, the Republican Party
representative sought to counter the statutory interpretation that would require subpoenaing felons to
testify about their candidate preference. Instead they sought to meet the statutory requirement
through a statistical analysis that inferred a certain percentage of the illegal felon vote to be distrib-
uted in accordance with the percentage of votes received by Gregoire and Rossi. David Postman,
Calculating Illegal Votes' Impact Could be Key to Election Lawsuit, GOP Favors Prorating by
Precinct, Democrats Demand Individual Accounting, SEATTLE TIMES, May 1, 2005, at B1. In a
subsequent hearing, the court stated that such statistical evidence would be permitted to be presented
at trial. However, the court's ruling should not be interpreted as acceptance of the validity of the
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The trial commenced with the Republican Party representatives
claiming that King County election officials engaged in fraud.228 How-
ever, the court stated that such an argument could not be made since
fraud allegations were not part of the case. 229 The court did permit the
Republican Party representatives to present their evidence regarding the
conduct of King County election officials in the 2004 election. 230 During
the two week trial consisting mostly of testimony from election officials
and experts,23 ' the court rejected a motion to dismiss the petition after the
close of petitioners' case in chief 232 and appeared to be skeptical of King
County's claim that the problems associated with the 2004 elections were
being addressed.233 Despite its skepticism of the process, the court dis-
missed the petition and confirmed the certification of Gregoire as the
state's governor.23 4 The court found a lack of fraud 35 and found the sta-
statistical method. David Postman, GOP Legal Challenge to Election Kept Alive, SEATTLE TIMES,
May 3, 2005, at Al. In response to the use of this statistical procedure, the Democratic Party repre-
sentatives stated that they would also present evidence of ineligible felons voting in voting precincts
that supported Rossi. Associated Press, Democrats Now Claim 544 Felons Cast Votes, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 5, 2005, at B3; David Postman, Dems Flag 743 Votes They Say Felons Cast, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 7, 2005, at B1. On the eve of trial, a newspaper study presented findings that demon-
strated that even without the felon vote, Gregoire would have won the election. Toss Out Felon Vote,
Gregoire Still Wins, Times Analysis Finds Felons Alone Wouldn't Change Governor's Race, Elec-
tion Trial Starts Tomorrow, SEATTLE TIMES, May 22, 2005, at A 1.
227. See Toss Out Felon Vote, Gregoire Still Wins, supra note 226. As trial preparations con-
tinued, in a stunning announcement, King County election officials declared that another 93 absentee
ballots had not been counted in the previous three voter tallies. Keith Ervin, Support Erodes for
Elections Director, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005, at Al.
228. David Postman, GOP Focuses on Election "Fraud, " New Central Claim: Governor's
Race Was Stolen, Judge: Allegation Can't Be Added on Trial's First Day, SEATTLE TIMES, May 24,
2005, at Al. The strategy behind the fraud allegations related to the Republican Party representa-
tive's burden of proof. If fraud was demonstrated, there would be no need to demonstrate that par-
ticular votes were cast for certain candidates. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. See David Postman, Leadoff Witness Key for GOP? Suspended King County Ballot Su-
pervisor Takes Stand Today, SEATTLE TIMES, May 25, 2005, at Al (testimony from an election su-
perintendent on an election report which Republican Party representatives contended was purpose-
fully falsified); David Postman, Numbers Speak for Themselves, GOP Says, SEATTLE TIMES, May
26, 2005, at AI (evidence on discrepancies showing that errors favored Gregoire permitted; an elec-
tion official testifying about the discrepancies in a previously presented election report); David
Postman, Felon-Voter Evidence Allowed, SEATTLE TIMES, May 27, 2005, at B 1 (expert testimony on
statistical procedures for pro-rating illegal felon vote). After the Republican Party representatives
closed their case, the Democratic Party representatives presented their witnesses-county auditors
and election officials-seeking to demonstrate that there was no fraud, only the normal errors that
are associated in statewide elections. See David Postman, Judge Won 't Dismiss Lawsuit, SEATTLE
TIMES, May 28, 2005, at B1.
232. Postman, Judge Won't Dismiss Lawsuit, supra note 23 1.
233. David Postman, Elections Chief Logan Put on Hot Seat-By Judge, SEATTLE TIMES, June
2, 2005, at Al.
234. Transcript of Court's Oral Decision at 25, Borders v. King County, No. 05-2-00027-3
(Thurston County Super. Ct., Wash. filed June 7, 2005).
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tistical method for prorating the impact of invalid votes presented by the
Republican Party representatives to be unacceptable. 236 The court con-
cluded that there were "1,678 illegal ballots cast in the 2004 general elec-
tion '' 237 and, most significantly, that the petitioners had not met their
statutory burden of proving that the illegal votes would have changed the
outcome of the election.238 After the court announced its decision, Rossi
stated that he would not appeal the court's ruling.2 39 And, in this manner,
the litigation phase of this electoral and political crisis ended.
IV. THE SUBSEQUENT REFORM MOVEMENTS
Perhaps the most positive aspect of this electoral and political crisis
is that a serious reform effort aimed at addressing the problems associ-
ated with the 2004 gubernatorial election was undertaken. This reform
was pursued in the state legislature, by the governor's office, and in King
County. In the legislative arena, changes included requiring the produc-
tion of paper records by voting devices; 240 mandating a review of elec-
tion policies, practices, and procedures, every three years, and requiring
county canvassing boards to take corrective action of any problems dis-
covered during this review with a verification by the Secretary of State
that such corrective action was taken;2 41 facilitating and expanding the
use of county-wide mail ballots; 242 and standardizing certain election
procedures, such as allowing the processing of absentee ballots upon re-
ceipt by election officials and mandating the reconciliation of election
numbers, as well as specifying that provisional ballots must be distin-
235. At the beginning of the proceedings the court stated that the fraud claim was not part of
the Republican petitioners' case. Nevertheless, the court stated in dicta that no fraud was evident
during the 2004 election. Id. at 15 ("No testimony has been placed before the Court to suggest fraud
or intentional misconduct.").
236. Id. at 16 ("The Court finds that the method of proportionate deduction and the assumption
relied upon by Professors Gill and Katz are a scientifically unaccepted use of the method of ecologi-
cal inference.").
237. Id. at 19.
238. Id. at 23 ("There is no substantial evidence by clear and convincing evidence that im-
proper conduct or irregularity procured Ms. Gregoire's election to the Office of Governor.").
239. David Postman, It's Over: Rossi Loses in Court, Ends Fight, Rossi Won't Appeal Ruling;
Gregoire Says She's "Personally Relieved," SEATTLE TIMES, June 7, 2005, at Al. Although the
election contest filed in Thurston County was over, there were still four election contest petitions
pending before the State Supreme Court. David Postman, Not All Election Suits Resolved, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 9, 2005, at B 1; see In Re Michael J. Goodall, No. 76541-3 (Wash. Sup. Ct. filed Jan.
19, 2005); In Re Suzanne Karr, No. 76500-6 (Wash. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 10, 2005); In Re Dr. Arthur
Coday, Jr., No. 76480-8 (Wash. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 7, 2005); In Re Daniel P. Stevens, No. 76479-4
(Wash. Sup. Ct. filed Jan. 4, 2005). As of November 1, 2005, the State Supreme Court had not dis-
posed of these cases.
240. 2005 Wash. Legis. Serv. 624-25 (West) (S.S.B. No. 5395).
241. Id. at 622 (H.B. No. 1749).
242. Id. at 623 (S.H.B. No. 1754).
2006]
Seattle University Law Review
guishable from other ballots.2 43 Although comprehensive and dealing
with such major issues as auditable paper trails for electronic voting ma-
chines and improving the handling of provisional ballots, the legislative
package did not deal with the major problem of having a primary elec-
tion so close in time to the general election. Many of the difficulties as-
sociated with the administration of elections in Washington are attribut-
able to the compressed time schedule between the primary and general
elections. 244 And, of course, adequate increased state funding for improv-
ing and conducting elections remains to be addressed.245
At the state executive level, Governor Gregoire formed an Election
Reform Task Force to make specific recommendations to improve the
administration of elections.246 On March 1, 2005, this Task Force issued
a Report identifying several areas of concern, such as moving the pri-
mary election date at least four weeks earlier than the present date, pro-
viding the Secretary of State with a greater role in insuring more consis-
tent administrative practices between counties, and making changes to
the method of handling provisional ballots.247
At the county level, King County Executive Ron Sims appointed an
Independent Task Force on Elections.248 Sims's Task Force issued a se-
ries of comprehensive reforms addressing the work culture of the elec-
tions department, management issues, and more immediate practical
243. Id. at 625-34 (S.S.B. No. 5499). Other changes related to voter registration recordkeeping
requirements, id. at 635-45 (S.S.B. No. 5743), and the publication of a manual on election laws and
rules, id. at 635 (S.B. No. 5565).
244. ELECTION REFORM TASK FORCE, REPORT 5 (Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://
www.secstate.wa.gov/elections/news/FinalReportofElectionReformTaskForce.pdf [hereinafter TASK
FORCE REPORT] ("The Task Force recommends that the date of the primary election be moved at
least four weeks earlier to give election supervisors sufficient time to certify the primary results, mail
the general election ballots, and prepare for the general election.").
245. Id. at 10 ("The state currently only contributes a share of the funding during each odd-
year election. It should not make a difference what year the election occurs. The Task Force recom-
mends the state fund its fair share of any election that includes any congressional or statewide posi-
tion or measure on the ballot.").
246. Emily Heffter, Gregoire in Everett on 1st day on Job, SEATTLE TIMES, January 14, 2005,
at B2.
247. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 244, at 5-10 (other reforms included requiring voter
identification at the polls, improving voter registration records, improving the processing of military
ballots, assuring statewide uniformity in the administration of elections, instituting greater protec-
tions to prevent voter fraud, implementing a consistent date for the certification of election results,
retaining the option to vote by mail on a local basis, restoring oversight authority and funding by the
Secretary of State to audit county election offices, a specific request for King County to improve its
election administration, and production of a voter pamphlet for the primary election if statewide
offices are listed on the ballot).
248. Alwyn Scott & Warren Cornwall, Sims' Panel to Probe Election Office, SEATTLE TIMES,
April 11, 2005, at BI; KING COUNTY INDEP. TASK FORCE ON ELECTIONS: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE KING COUNTY EXECUTIVE 6 (July 27, 2005), available at
http://www.secstate.wa.gov/documentvault/846.pdf [hereinafter KING COUNTY REPORT].
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concerns including permitting observers to stand near tables where the
actual counting of ballots is occurring. 49 This Task Force also recom-
mended legislative changes that would restore voting rights to former
felons upon release from incarceration and would move the state's pri-
mary election to an earlier date. °
The implementation of the newly enacted legislative reforms and
the enactment of the reforms proposed by the Governor's Election Re-
form Task Force and King County's Independent Task Force on Elec-
tions should improve the administration of elections in the State of
Washington and increase the opportunity for providing minorities with
greater access to the political process. For example, the proposed
changes to the handling of provisional ballots will not only insure the
integrity of the vote canvass, but will also generate greater awareness of
the availability of provisional ballots. Such a wider public awareness will
benefit minority communities where voters who were once prevented
from voting without protesting the actions of poll officials will now insist
on voting on a provisional basis. As more funding is made available and
as more electronic voting machines are utilized, there will be greater op-
portunities for the translation of ballots into languages other than Eng-
lish. In summary, as the pace of electoral reforms increases, there will be
a greater convergence between improvements in the administration of
elections and in the political integration of minority communities into the
body politic. 251
V. CONCLUSION
For a brief moment, the political and electoral crisis created by the
2004 gubernatorial election seemed insurmountable. Although the uncer-
tainty surrounding the state's gubernatorial succession was ultimately
resolved by two recounts, two state supreme court decisions, and an elec-
tion contest, discrepancies in the canvassing of the votes and other mal-
functions served to significantly erode public confidence in the integrity
of the electoral process. Restoring public confidence will require a con-
249. KING COUNTY REPORT, supra note 248, at 9-18.
250. Id.
25 1. Unfortunately, not all legislative reforms are an improvement. In Georgia, the state legis-
lature enacted one of the most restrictive requirements for voting in the nation. In order to be permit-
ted to vote, voters will need to present a photo identification card. Such a requirement is the func-
tional equivalent of a poll tax. In order to secure such a state identification card many persons, who
do not drive and thus do not have a driver's license, will have to pay to secure this form of identifi-
cation. This requirement will have a disproportionate impact on minority eligible and registered
voters. The implementation of this requirement has been enjoined by a federal district court See
Common Cause/Georgia v. Billups, No. 4:05-CV-201-HLM (N.D. Ga. Oct. 28, 2005) (order grant-
ing preliminary injunction).
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certed response by the state's executive and legislative branches of gov-
ernment to create a more transparent election machinery that is both well
funded and well managed. The recently enacted legislation and proposed
reforms are only a beginning.
Although these legislative improvements in Washington may herald
a new era of election reform, these reforms are part of a historical proc-
ess that commenced with the adoption and ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment and continued with the civil rights struggles that sought to
end voting discrimination. The efforts to provide minority communities
with greater access to the political process highlighted the importance of
the right to vote. The trajectory of these efforts to expand the franchise
also provided an important context to those reform efforts aimed at im-
proving the administration of elections. Both of these efforts ultimately
will result in an election system that is more accessible to all communi-
ties by seeking the removal of obstacles that unfairly inhibit voter par-
ticipation and in providing for a more open and efficient administration
of elections. These reform efforts received renewed public attention as a
result of the 2004 gubernatorial electoral and political crises. The chal-
lenge facing the state's political leadership is to address the issue of elec-
toral reform in a manner that serves to both restore and enhance public
confidence in the conduct of elections.
The Symposium and the articles included in this issue seek to assist
the state's political leaders in defining both the scope and nature of this
challenge, as well as to stress the urgency of enacting legislative reforms
to improve the state's election machinery. Such urgency was certainly
recognized by those voters who took the time to prepare and submit let-
ters to newspaper editors expressing their outrage over the seemingly
never-ending saga of election snafus. 252 In response to this voter discon-
tent and distrust, this Symposium was convened to initiate and further a
much-needed dialogue that focused not only on technical improvements
of the state's electoral process, but that also highlighted the important
broader issues of restoring and preserving the public's confidence in the
conduct of elections in order to promote a more cohesive body politic.
The work product of this Symposium is now reflected in this issue. The
purpose of this Symposium issue is to play a role in the new reform ef-
fort by providing a compass as legislators, state and local elected offi-
cials, and policymakers navigate through the maze of electoral reform.
The materials here encourage them to maintain their focus on the task at
hand: the task of rebuilding public trust in the exercise of that most fun-
damental of all rights-the right to vote.
252. See sources supra note 16.
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